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“Philosophy of Happiness” is a phrase used by self-help, religious, philosophical, and empirical inquiries 
to describe their premises, arguments, and conclusions on what happiness is and how it can be secured. 
The commonality of this phrase hides a vast variety of concepts and degrees of achievement about the 
subject. This article provides a critical overview of these contributions. To follow its analysis, we need to 
start with the fundamental questions what Philosophy of Happiness is and why it matters. The answers 
to these questions emerge if we examine the component terms of this phrase in relation to each other.  
1. The Definition of Happiness.
Let us first look at “happiness.” It stands for a concept that is immediately accessible to everyone. We do 
not need anybody to tell us what it means. So I am not going to do that. But just to compare our ideas of 
happiness, let me tell you how I understand it: Happiness originates in our needs. Their motivations are 
expressed in wishes that focus these needs. Happiness happens in successful 
pursuits of needs and wishes, their gratifications, and our anticipations and 
memories of these events. Failures in their progression cause unhappiness. 
As painful opposite sensation of happiness, unhappiness helps to give us a 
better sense for what happiness means. It also works as a deterrent for our 
conduct, as much as the pleasure of happiness forms an attractant.  
I don’t think there is a lot more to say about happiness as a general 
concept other than this: Happiness is a fiercely individual phenomenon. This 
may not be apparent at times. As humans, we have much in common, which 
causes commonalities in how we define our happiness and how we pursue 
it. The commonalities all humans share can give rise to fundamental rules 
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for securing happiness and for warding off unhappiness. These rules 
cover the fundamentals of our existence and thriving we all require. 
They universally and continuously apply to all humans. However, 
beyond common basics, happiness expresses itself with individual 
differentiations. This is logical because we each are our own person. 
No two individuals are identical. We regularly observe that people 
are noticeably different from one another despite basic or particular 
commonalties. Who we are is probable to differ much due to factors 
that make up our particular personal entirety. These factors include 
categories of our physical and mental constitution and capacity, our 
environment, our experiences, and resulting knowledge, resources, 
dreams, hopes, fears, regrets, affinities, aversions, and expectations. 
Countless differing and developing articulations in and among these 
factors form our needs and wishes and thus definitions of happiness. 
To be sure, any of these factors 
may resemble factors of other humans. 
Such occurrences can give rise to partial 
commonalities along the way of individual paths. We may find ourselves in the 
same or similar settings as others. We may have commonalities in means we 
possess or want. How we perceive such circumstances may be similar. There 
is also a chance that we resemble other people in more personal factors. After 
all, we are members of the same species who are regularly placed and act in 
conditions that are shared with other humans or at least the same world. Such 
circumstances can create significant advantages but also competition in our 
interactions. Opportunities for cooperation or competition can also arise from 
our differences. Our ideas of objectives and favored ways to pursue them can 
differ significantly from the ideas of others, even those who share a large number of factors with us. With 
all similarities among individual ideas, material differences remain that separate us from one another in 
how we define happiness. These are often magnified since the factors entering our definition of happiness 
interact with one another. This gives differences in factors the ability to color similarities in others.  
The importance of these factors and of their variances for individual 
happiness has habitually been repressed by natural or imposed conditions. 
To date, most human development has been characterized by circumstances 
in which securing basic needs has been difficult enough. This has often not 
left many or any resources or motivations to work out individual wishes and 
particularities. And even where we are not subjected to a struggle for basic 
necessities, we may not feel completely secure. We may anticipate that our 
individual wishes have to step back when satisfaction of our basic needs is 
threatened. However, these common denominators are not all we are about 
as humans. Rather they are the basis from which our imagination and growth 
take flight. We dream of doing our own thing, making someone of ourselves, 
living improved or optimized lives. That this can mostly only happen after we 
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secure our existential necessities has historically skewed humans’ concept of 
happiness because securing fundamental needs has been such a persistent 
struggle. Besides being formed by this struggle, our outlook on happiness has 
also been significantly shaped by our traditional social organizations to win 
this struggle. Strict hierarchical and tribal conventions have placed societies 
ahead of personal motivations and activities of their members. Only recently 
have individuals’ claims of basic needs and resulting basic rights grown strong 
enough to be broadly and deeply recognized. And only lately have individual 
contributions to a society become appreciated enough to promote individual 
differentiations as a societal benefit. Humans are just coming into their own 
by gaining the ability to practice particularities and what makes them happy 
as distinct and free individuals. Only in the span of a few generations have 
significant numbers of us acquired sufficient freedom to sustainably define 
our happiness in ways unique to us according to the particular ingredients 
that formed us. It is then completely understandable that many of us have 
not fully grasped the importance or exhilaration of individual pursuits. And 
it is no wonder we are relative novices at filling this freedom with purpose 
and success. In many ways of its range, happiness is a new phenomenon.  
Realizing our concept of happiness is compiled by the factors that 
define us and by the interactions of such factors is only the beginning of 
fathoming this phenomenon. It merely shows us general categories of our 
existence that form our definition of happiness. It does not show us what 
exactly makes us happy. As for happiness itself, we know it as a resultant 
feeling when we experience harmonization or harmony of our conditions 
with our objectives and pursuits. And we feel unhappiness when they lack. 
But neither happiness nor unhappiness are monolithic. We feel different kinds of either depending on the 
related need and we feel them in varieties of intensities and durations. Also, these aspects are not only 
determined by directly connected events. Such events are embedded in everything else that influences 
our happiness at a time. The entirety of our circumstances measured by the entirety of our definitions of 
happiness dictates how we feel. The complexity of this entirety makes our happiness uniquely ours. 
The emotional qualities and nuances of happiness reserve judgment on 
it to each of us because we are the only ones feeling them. They also make us 
best suited to identify the objectives and the pursuits we want to employ to 
secure and optimize our happiness. This is because we can feel exactly how the 
results of our choices affect our happiness. That this is so coincides well with our 
surroundings. We most probably are the ones most interested in our happiness 
since others are busy minding theirs. Our happiness may coincidentally benefit 
as a consequence of them being who they are. But others are likely to care about 
our happiness only in as far as it advances theirs. We may just not be aware of 
this egocentric stance because making us happy may make them happy as well. 
In this context of suiting their objectives, they may understand and enhance our 
happiness to levels beyond fundamentals. Still, this would occur from a relative 
Albertus Magnus  
(1200-1280) 
Alduous Huxley  
(1894-1963)  
Alexander v. Humboldt 
(1769-1859) 
Text © 2020 by Martin Janello                                                                  4                                     
 
distance based on what we tell them, their observations of us, explanations of us 
shared by others, and from drawing parallels or distinctions with themselves or 
others they know. Having such attentive attitudes directed at us and the mutuality 
of extending such attitudes appear to be important ingredients for happiness. 
However, even if others dedicated themselves to that objective, they could only 
approximate the proficiency and detail with which we can know our happiness.  
This reflection begs the question whether we have sufficiently developed 
our knowledge about matters of happiness, whether we know enough about it to 
advance or optimize it and to keep events of unhappiness to a minimum. Under a 
cursory review, we should be in good shape just based on our sensory system. 
Our emotional impressions of happiness and unhappiness with differentiations of 
types and nuances give us ultimate motivations for objectives and pursuits. They 
also create a finely tuned compass and measuring device for our selection of objectives and pursuits. But 
they can only teach us by trial and error. In their lessons, they can only give evidence for, but not replace, 
our search for objectives and pursuits and their consideration. This is where philosophy comes into play. 
2. The Definition of Philosophy of Happiness. 
Our philosophy of happiness is our consideration of what happiness is and how we can make it happen 
and optimize it. Calling this a philosophy may seem overstated. But hear me out. When we try to define 
the objectives and pursuits for our happiness, we often look for orientation, for guidance, for principles - 
for rules in a wider sense. And certainly, there is no lack of 
rules affecting us, not all of which are likely to be geared 
toward serving our happiness. Our parents, family, friends, 
social contacts, other individuals and groups in society, and 
society as a whole try to make us abide by their rules. Rules 
are imposed on us by education, profession, employment, 
and the economy. Governments and religions subject us to 
rules. And underlying everything are the rules of nature. 
We do not receive all rules in 
a written or verbal form, or by 
example. Even in the absence 
of stated rules, circumstances 
in us and our environment are 
shaped by rules. And they in turn impose on us their resulting obligations, 
pathways, limits, and standards that could be called rules. Thus, our existence 
and its potentials occur within organized structures and processes. 
Few rules appear inevitable or mandatory in a sense that we cannot 
act otherwise if we wanted to. For the vast majority of rules, following them 
seems to be up to us. But our non-compliance may produce consequences or 
risks of consequences we may not be willing to take on. Our needs, wishes, 
and pursuits fall into this category of discretion. Some of their essential parts 
may seem nonnegotiable if we want to survive or are otherwise hard-pressed 
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in our affairs. Still, we may decide against 
following their pleas. And we may possess 
choices how to get to what we absolutely 
need or want. Past fundamentally critical 
requirements, we are likely to experience 
our options opening up more. There may 
be myriads of paths to choose from at any 
moment to thrive or get by. But they may 
conduct us to different intensities or sorts 
of happiness or unhappiness in the course 
of their pursuit, at the instant of reaching 
their destinations, or subsequent thereto. 
And paths to happiness may be difficult to 
distinguish from paths to unhappiness. A 
path toward happiness may lead through unhappiness. Or it may initially show us happiness and then lead 
to unhappiness. Many paths may offer mediocre results either continuously 
or in medians of ups and downs. Some may be more trying or costly than 
others with results more or less reflecting the effort. Paths may in all or in 
some of their possibilities be undetermined. They may offer prospects of a 
variety of ratios between risks and potential results. It may be difficult or 
impossible to foresee where they lead, how we progress on them, and what 
effect we can have. We may only know how happy or unhappy paths make 
us after tallies at their end, without ability to compare them to alternatives. 
But despite many unknowns, we can be sure that all paths will be 
governed by rules. The particular sets of rules connected to each path may 
differ depending on the type of path and the terrain it traverses. They may 
contain rules for finding or laying out our track and how to build or modify 
it. They may give it boundaries, prescribe tracks, or grant guardrails. They 
may encourage, permit, or forbid us to jump or join tracks, take detours, halt, branch off, or reverse. They 
may condition such and other modifications or give us instructions how to 
undertake, prevent, or circumvent them. They may tell us how to advance 
and pace ourselves or how to conduct ourselves if we encounter obstacles, 
dead ends, forks in the road, poor visibility, or pitfalls. Different rules may 
apply at different junctures of our path or depending on the selections we 
make during its pursuit, and rules themselves may change or evolve as we 
proceed. The list of possible track metaphors goes on.  
It is up to us whether we want to find out and think about these 
rules as much as they can be recognized or anticipated. We may decide to 
undertake this before we select and embark on a track or while we are on 
it. But we ignore the rules for our objectives and their pursuit at our risk. 
This is a risk we may not want to take or at least may want to reduce. We 
may then resolve to analyze what our needs and wishes are and make plans 
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how to meet them considering the rules for their pursuit. How can we take 
account of and understand all these rules in ourselves and our environment 
and how they apply to different paths? Which paths are available and how 
do we select among them? Which sets of rules apply to which paths? Do we 
have choices among rules on the same path? And if so, how do we select the 
right ones for us? How do we select among competing rules and competing 
systems of rules? Are we blindly or obediently following rules or do we allow 
ourselves be forced to abide by rules? Do we comply passively or perfunctory 
or actively support them? Do we take part in their generation, maintenance 
or enforcement? Do we openly reject rules or covertly work against them? 
Do we attempt to evade them, change them, or escape them by changing our 
venue or circumstances? Which rules are immutable or inescapable? What 
are the possible consequences of non-compliance and how high are the risks? 
These are questions we must answer to take care of our happiness. And many 
of our answers will have to be particularized to the situation and may change as we move through life and 
encounter changes in us or in our surroundings and possibly new paths or sections of paths. Also, the 
review and application of rules are not linear. Needs and wishes change and means for their fulfillment 
compete, and we keep having to arrange them. And our 
pursuits are likely to occur in settings where others are 
pursuing their happiness. This entails arrangements to 
get along as well as a significant cooperation potential. 
Arrangements among people or groups can be a source 
for formal or informal rules to regulate and guide their 
existence together. Such arrangements and the rules to 
administrate them may change in time as contributing 
factors change and as individuals and societies develop.  
We then must cope with the fact that our paths 
as well as the rise and application of rules we encounter 
are dynamic processes. We must continually evaluate 
and re-evaluate paths and their rules and how we can 
serve our happiness in their context. We also have to cope with the fact that 
many rules are of a prohibitive character. They may prescribe a framework 
within which to operate. But they may not tell us how to fill these outer 
parameters with constructive substance and procedures. Other rules may 
only give us generally constructive guidance that requires fleshing out and 
detailing. Or they may only give us tools for pursuits but not tell us how to 
use them, what to produce with them, or how useful they can be. We also 
may cast how we respond to circumstances into rules of our own when we 
detect that this might help us in making faster or better decisions in future 
similar circumstances. How do we decide this and how do we formulate our 
rules? Do we even need rules of our own or can or should we rely on other 
sources? Are things too complicated and varying for rules to make sense? 
Might they prevent us from addressing issues with the required flexibility? 
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Or should we live in the moment, form our intent then, and apply what we 
can find when we need or want something? And, regardless of inclination 
to foresee or plan, we may not possess the luxury of doing so. We stand to 
encounter situations where no previously applicable or trusted rules seem 
much help. We may not have the time or information to weigh alternatives. 
We may have to make choices based on gut feelings, relying on the compass 
of the entirety of who we are and what we have learned. In such situations, 
we may not be able to trace decisions in the moment. We may only be able 
to afterwards assess whether we acted correctly and what to do if similar 
situations challenge us. But what situations are similar enough to warrant 
an application of these rules and how do we allow for variables? 
3. Taking Refuge from the Complexity of Happiness. 
Finding our way through a complicated world that we only have limited means to understand, predict, 
and influence is complicated and can be taxing and frustrating. It often demands complicated collections 
of information, assessments, and deliberations as well as constructive attitudes and approaches from us. 
This is why we have every right to call this process, its principles, methods, and results our philosophy of 
happiness. Happiness is complex because it involves the entirety of our subjective and objective reality. 
All we undergo, perceive, think, feel, and undertake in connection with our self or human and nonhuman 
surroundings can influence our happiness. For our entire life, we remain 
occupied with reaching for, and holding on to, a multitude of facets of 
happiness in ever-changing settings. And we are longing to arrange them 
into a beautifully cut diamond. Experience may tell us that arriving at a 
point at which all the facets of our happiness will be aligned in perfect 
harmony will be short-lived, if it is possible at all. We might for these 
reasons try to lower our expectations. We might set our sights on more 
realistic lower levels of harmony and lesser levels of perfection for the 
individual facets of our happiness to better match our capacities. We 
might focus on essential needs and let other parts slide.  
Still, we may not get much control 
over our needs and wishes. If they remain 
unfulfilled, they develop the tendency of 
staying with us as dreams we would love to fulfill if we had the chance. And 
our pursuit of ideals diminished to our capacities may still stress or exceed 
our capacities. After all, capacities are frequently the results of our successes 
in prior pursuits. If we lower our ambitions and pursuits, our capacities may 
follow. We may be lucky enough to possess enough material or other means 
to take the worry out of securing some of our capacities. But the capacities 
necessary to satisfy our needs and wishes may differ depending on the need 
or wish. They also may not be translatable into one another. It seems that no 
matter who we are or what we have accomplished, we still must work on 
having a good life and even more so to animate our life to its fullest. We also 
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experience that happiness is not a one-time, lasting accomplishment but 
has to be maintained or regained in all its facets. Pursuing our happiness 
may then be exhausting work and we might end up exhausted unless we 
can secure adequate happiness to make our pursuits worthwhile. Despite 
all optimism we might have, the concern of not being able to satisfy our 
wishes and needs, of remaining or becoming unhappy, descending even 
to becoming existentially threatened, continues to haunt us. 
This complexity paired with these concerns can make people shy 
away from tackling happiness in a comprehensive manner. They might 
not feel up to this critical challenge and may want to take refuge. Now, 
turning away from the challenges our happiness proposes to us does not 
seem inevitable. After all, we would not have to start from scratch to build 
a philosophy of happiness of our own. We could derive such a philosophy 
in large part by questioning existing rules and practices and reflecting on them. We could learn as we go 
to see how our ideas and pursuits fare, and we could draw conclusions from them how to handle similar 
situations. We might compare our views on happiness with views of others to see how they could fit us. 
This sort of questioning, testing, comparing, and reflecting seems to go on in everybody’s mind to some 
degree. The resulting collection of experiences may eventually make us wiser about setting objectives and 
pursuing them. But tragically, it may take us most of our life to accumulate 
enough knowledge or means for a happy life. Or this may never happen. We 
may run out of time and capacity to make our dreams a reality. We may not 
want to run this risk. So we might prepare for an eventual investment in the 
right pursuits by gathering means. But we may not get to spend them or be 
able to give them the necessary opportunity to flourish. We may not be able 
to enjoy their fruits as much, or our enjoyment may be shortened by their 
late arrival. These impressions inject us with impatience.  
In this situation, elders in our circle of family and friends may try to 
impart some of their wisdom to us. But we may not take them seriously for 
various reasons. They may seem distant from us at their stage in life, distant 
from our aim and vigor, our mind and mindset, 
our thirst for life, our capabilities, our needs or 
wishes, our settings, our times. We may also discount elders’ advice because 
we have seen them not living according to their late-acquired wisdom. We 
may not believe that the wisdom they share with us has made their life any 
or much happier. We may discount what little they achieved in application 
of their wisdom. If their achievements are great, we may decide these are 
not as important to us and that we do not want to go down the same path. 
The understanding and communication between generations is additionally 
disturbed by family dynamics. This naturally includes children trying to break 
free from the guardianship of their elders to become independent. But the 
weightiest reason we don’t listen, or why elder advice is ineffective even if 
we listen, is most probably that we are too different from others in principle, 
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even with all the affinities between friends and family and regardless of 
our position in relationships or age. We could not learn from them all we 
need for our happiness even if we wanted and they offered it. Whatever 
the reasons might be in a particular instance, a generational transfer of 
wisdom about happiness does not work very well. Beyond imparting a 
few pointers and general maxims, instruction by our elders is incapable 
of granting us a shortcut toward figuring out our happiness. They leave 
us with the independence we might need anyway to find our fortune.  
Still, we may not trust in ourselves at all or entirely with such a 
monumental undertaking to extract the desired directions in reasonable 
time or ever. Maybe this is due to a genuine mental inability. But I think 
most who feel such a reluctance to exert self-determination suffer from 
other deficiencies that stem from and in turn cause a lack of preparation. 
People who shy from developing their own philosophy of happiness may 
not have discovered this is possible. They 
may not have learned to reflect about or 
assess their happiness for themselves. They may have been prevented by 
induced or otherwise occurring stresses. Or they may have been told other 
values outrank happiness generally or their happiness. They may not even 
have had an opportunity to recognize happiness as an objective or objective 
worth pursuing. Not possessing a good foundation for developing their own 
philosophy of happiness, many of us might feel incapable of doing so right 
from the start or after some frustrating dabbling. 
Nevertheless, our innate needs as humans and open life questions 
connected to them urge us for competent responses. As this urgency grows 
from our failure to respond, we may look, or be receptive, to try, emulate, 
or espouse somebody else’s philosophy of happiness. Without much of an 
idea of our own, we may prefer broadly inclusive solutions. We may prefer buying into ideological systems 
that provide us with turnkey models for objectives and pursuits. Or we 
may prefer to pick and choose among a menu of ideas and pathways 
toward happiness. Either way, our lack of experience and fear of being 
overwhelmed by life’s decision-making demands may make us prefer 
simplicity. We may favor fast and easy-to-follow instructions that do 
away with the prickly complexities in the pursuit of happiness. If ideas 
or their systems seem too incomplete, general, or hard to understand, 
we may seek help interpreting and applying them. We may search for 
someone with superior insight to summarize, compare, and endorse 
philosophies of happiness or parts of them for us. If we cannot decide 
which ideas to adopt, we may seek authoritative guidance in selecting. 
Or we might think we can pick among philosophies and ideas without 
further aid after allowing them and their proponents opportunities to 
convince us or at least impress us with a likelihood of success. 
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4. Self-Help Contributions to Philosophy of Happiness.  
This attitude has created a massive market for self-help presentations 
and books peddling ideas of happiness. Most of these are unhelpful or 
misleading in too many ways to list them all. A good number of them 
sell feel-good fluff. They contain naïve opinions and recipes that display 
their incompetence on their face. Or they suggest niceties that might 
soothe symptoms of unhappiness or give people a little lift but fail to 
address deeper questions of happiness. Some publications pretend to 
give answers to such questions. They cleverly exploit the gullibility of 
consumers to believe the wildest claims without genuine proof. Others 
flatter with false, superficial empowerment, including that we each are 
perfect as is or can do anything we set our mind to, against all obvious 
evidence of human imperfections and limitations. Still others attempt 
to implant readers with concepts of what happiness really is or who they 
should be and how they should act or change their mind to be happy. These 
tactics are often hyped by success stories, celebrity endorsements, or more 
remote apparent authorities to add respectability or fashionability.  
Not all self-help attempts regarding happiness can be disqualified 
as superficial, nonsensical, or misleading. Some do offer suggestions about 
happiness that merit consideration. But these are far and between, and 
searching for kernels of wisdom in a sea of chaff is frustrating. Often, mere 
kernels are all there is to a book that promises an abundant harvest. Even 
with all kinds of anecdotal fillers, illustrations, large print, spacing, margins, 
thick paper, and other design tricks many of these writings barely make it 
to book size. It is tiresome to pay good money for and read on and on about 
a stretched-out idea that could have been described on a few pages. If one 
spots something that rings true, it is often a commonsense insight that is 
sensationalized as groundbreaking revelation. Even if we find something of potential utility beyond the 
trite, its actual utility is frequently compromised. Most of the ideas warranting consideration either stay 
too general and detached from our lives, focus only on partial aspects of our lives, or vastly overstate the 
place of a technique or concept in the pursuit of happiness. Even if we can 
appreciate their utility, there are so many disjointed or contradictory recipes 
and tips for happiness we could collect that it becomes impossible to make 
much connected sense of them. Even where propositions elaborate in more 
detail, they are, with very few exceptions, popularized concepts or parts of 
concepts loaned from other sources that are better described by these or 
secondary sources. Beyond that, their popularization habitually includes an 
entertainment aspect, which as a mere vehicle of conveying information is 
not objectionable. But this aspect may threaten or be geared to take over 
the knowledge or skill to be imparted. Worthwhile methods or substance 
may be packaged with motivational showmanship into events that take on 
importance of their own for participants’ happiness. They may draw people 
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who wish to overcome their loneliness, to belong, to be acknowledged, to be 
close to their idol, or to be affected by a positive outlook. Consumers may count 
fulfillment of these wishes as a significant progress in their happiness and may 
become conditioned to continue the motivational relationship in dependency 
and monetization. Strategies exploiting such fragilities convert the idea of self-
help into its opposite. They shape funnels and channels of alignment that curb 
independent judgment and action, thus showing signs of becoming a cult.  
Such conversions of the self-help model might be extremes. Still, after 
reviewing a lot of self-help approaches over the years, I came to the conclusion 
that, at best, most are a waste of time and money. Even with the better ones, 
I was regularly glad to have read them at the bookstore or seen a video of them 
and not having spent any money or any more time on them. At worst, the self-
help materials I reviewed threaten to talk victims into investing themselves in 
ill-conceived or overwrought objectives or strategies that in all likelihood will 
not pan out. This may cause or worsen unhappiness in vulnerable consumers 
who may already suffer various degrees of unhappiness and long for more 
happiness. Whatever the nature and merit of self-help ideas might be, I have 
not found anything in this category that would do justice to the complexity of 
happiness even in partial aspects let alone its comprehensive interrelation.  
Acknowledging the complexity of happiness may be unpopular with 
some audiences because it implies that a broad diversity of efforts is and will 
remain necessary. They would rather hear about a few simple fixes that can 
propel them to, and keep them in, a happy state. Or they would rather hear 
superficial suggestions to tell themselves they are actually doing something to 
improve their happiness when in fact they are not. Just consuming self-help 
materials may keep them in that imaginary constructive mindset. They may 
derive rewards from them that are similar to those from watching cooking 
shows whose recipes one never tries or at least does not incorporate into one’s cooking routines. Just 
buying self-help books or attending self-help seminars may make us feel better about ourselves. The 
consumption of such materials may give us permission to give in to fears of 
leaving our comfort zones by merely reading about leaving it. Purveyors of 
self-help materials may thus get away with inferior quality or inapplicable 
suggestions. But they may also respond to such consumer attitudes with 
diminished depth or detail in their offerings. They may want to avoid being 
at odds with an audience that prefers easy and quick solutions. Then again, 
the complexity of happiness is already unpopular with most presenters of 
happiness propositions since it tends to make their ideas look deficient or 
small. This has produced an alignment of wishes on both sides of self-help 
instruction that has prevented an adequately deep and broad discussion of 
happiness in this field. But maybe this is asking too much from the self-help 
genre. Maybe one has to turn to higher, more recognized authorities to 
find more profound treatments of the subject of happiness. 
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5. Religious Contributions to Philosophy of Happiness.  
Religions are often cited as important if not primary sources for improving the 
human condition. Their inclusive knowledge and regulation of human affairs are 
commonly regarded as sources of ultimate competence and reliability on how 
to live one’s life. This confidence is based on the assurances of divine texts that 
in many religions are relayed and interpreted by a professional clergy. In fact, 
such systems typically contain good ideas for what to do and not to do in pursuit 
of a good life. However, their direction regarding human objectives and pursuits 
is heavily influenced by their introduction of speculative concepts into a rational 
conversation. This conversation may be restricted by justifications not open to 
proof or reason. But it also stands to be expanded by placing human happiness 
into a larger context in which humanity and its happiness may not be a primary 
objective. By introducing beings more powerful than humans, human existence 
and happiness is largely characterized by the relationship with these beings.  
In many religions, this relationship is defined by myths that establish humanity and its world as 
divine creations. Religious views regarding the manner or purpose of this creation vary. They may include 
predecessor, successor, or intermediary beings that exert divine power. But religions mostly imply from 
divine creation a hierarchy of importance from which they derive a priority of 
divine happiness. To find application of this priority among humans, religions 
have to explain how human objectives and pursuits relate to those of the deities 
they describe. An essential feature for the priority of divine happiness is that the 
deities set the rules for human conduct and thus human happiness. That seems 
in order. Arguably, the more advanced or absolute capacities and vantage points 
of deities allow them a better understanding of how human affairs ought to be 
organized. And this competence and authority appears to be out of question if 
the creating deity sets the rules. It can be presumed to have fashioned humanity 
according to a plan and to have the ability of perfectly matching rules applicable 
to them. But most of all, creation suggests a creator’s caring parental interest in 
the welfare and thriving of the creation. As a 
consequence, a belief in creating deities would 
make it seem logical to let them set rules and for humans to comply. 
This trust may extend to superhuman entities in the creation hierarchy 
depending on their character and ascribed conduct, or commonality of 
creation and implied combined purpose divined by the creating deity. 
The varieties in which deities are said to shape human behavior 
with their rules are too many to address in this context. Most describe 
reciprocal relationships in which both divine beings and humans benefit 
by providing each other what they need or want. This harmonizes with 
human parallels to a creative context and might be seen as the purpose 
of creation. But mutuality may also be said to include entities on other 
levels in a creation hierarchy. Humans may struggle understanding all 
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the rules these relationships imply. But their belief in the benevolent 
nature of divine beings or the potential of keeping or rendering them 
benevolent may cause followers to comply with hierarchic mandates. 
Compliance is expected to lead followers to higher and highest levels 
of happiness or at least to enable them to maximize their happiness 
under their circumstances. Since deities are thought to rarely speak to 
humans or interfere in human affairs, representatives are customarily 
deemed required to receive and disseminate divine communications, 
convince heathens they should become believers, and direct human 
affairs in conformance with divine intent. Founders of religions are not 
able to undertake this task on their own and their lifetime limits their 
capacity in continuing it. This implies the establishment of religions as 
administrative agencies. Claiming supreme authority in the absence 
of their founders and gods, religions assume the functions of stating, 
interpreting, imposing, and enforcing the rules of their creed. Without 
them, divine directives could be unheeded, falsified, or fade away. They 
thus take on a dominant function in the relationship between humans 
and gods. To the extent religious teachings carry commonly agreeable 
ideas, they can be recognized as forces assisting human happiness. But 
humans may struggle finding such ideas due to lack of access to a range 
of religions from which they might choose. They may also have trouble 
discerning ideas among competing religions or within religions. It seems 
then of vital interest for religions to help actual and potential subjects 
identify with their teachings because this acts as a commonsense litmus 
test for the applicability of a religion on its asserted higher levels.  
A decision regarding the applicability of religious teachings may 
be difficult if they primarily rely on spiritual premises and benefits that 
ultimately cannot be evidenced but only believed or not believed. This, 
combined with the irritant that religions may assert dissimilar notions, 
makes entrusting oneself to a religion a leap of faith. Even if we are born 
into a situation where a free offer or selection among religions is prevented, 
we may at some point wonder whether the religion imposed on us carries true 
notions and what these are. In answering these questions, we may believe in 
the original creed but have reservations regarding its management. The fact 
that religious agencies are led and staffed by humans exposes them to human 
failings. They may commit errors and other lapses in dispatching their duties. 
The by far greatest threat to religions, their underlying faith, and followers is 
an abuse of power by human proxies for deities. This threat is great because 
of the great imbalance of power between gods and humans. Religions might 
not exercise this power. But their potential for its exercise alone is fearsome. 
The prospect of abusing this potential attracts illegitimate elements. They may 
view organizational advantages of religions, paired with decreased resistance 
and open mindsets of their followers, prime tools for their selfish purposes.  
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One of such purposes may be misappropriating resources on a 
personal supply scale by pretense of religious dedication and service. The 
risk such grifters pose seems controllable. But impostors may aim much 
higher to usurp, convert, and wield powers of religions for selfish secular 
or sectarian purposes. By impersonating service to a religion, they may 
try to reach levels of power that they otherwise could not reach or could 
only reach with more risk or effort. These ambitions may stretch as far as 
the potentials of religions will carry them. To come to power, usurpers 
preferably target religions with centralized or decentralized, hierarchical 
administrations because their structures seem best equipped to assume 
and exert domination. Usurpers may try to rise through the levels of such 
hierarchies or put themselves in leading positions through other means. 
Whatever rank they might reach in such hierarchies, to be safe they can 
never drop their pretense as long as the organization remains beholden 
to claimed divine service. They must justify all their behavior by this service to keep the religious apparatus 
working for them. Even in their changes to a religious system in their favor, they must hold the line that 
their variations represent the true faith and that opponents are to be 
attacked as heretics. Such ruses are often assisted by surrounding selfish 
pursuits with actual service. Usurpers may not even admit their secular 
or sectarian ambitions to themselves or to their inner circles. All this can 
make their unmasking difficult. And once they reach leading positions, 
use of hierarchical domination further reduces the chances of saving the 
religion. These susceptibilities make lasting conversions of hierarchical 
religions seem rather likely unless they are closely guarded. 
To be most successful, usurpers may pursue absolute power. In 
forming this objective as well as its pursuit, they may take guidance from 
secular examples. However, the spiritual dimension of religions adds an 
opportunity to expand and fortify absolute power. Religions create this 
opportunity by establishing their gods as absolute sovereigns combined 
with establishing the principle of absolute obedience to these gods. This 
subordination of humans to deities accords divine happiness absolute 
priority over the happiness of humans. Human objectives and pursuits 
are adjudicated by how well they fit into this divine priority. But there is 
another element to the priority of deities. Humans are not only expected 
to step back in favor of deities. They are expected to actively contribute 
to deities’ happiness as top priority in setting their own objectives and 
conducting their pursuits. Human behavior is then judged by religions’ 
imaginings of how deities require humans to behave in reverence and 
service to the deities. Even though religions make such absolute claims, 
they commonly assert to compensate them. Most benefits religions offer 
to followers for their subordination and service are said to be triggered 
by these very acts of granting deities priority. Religions commonly claim 
that true or supreme happiness can only be gained from an unqualified 
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surrender and service to their deities. Such happiness is said 
to flow from the relationship itself and from more palpable 
benefits that emanate from resulting divine protection and 
care. Religions regularly assert that these benefits not only 
compensate followers for their sacrifices, but elevate their 
happiness to formerly unfeasible heights. The subordination 
and subservience commonly advocated by religions are thus 
said to promote the happiness of followers as well, creating 
settings in which both deities and followers can be happy. 
Usurpers, on the other hand, mostly tend to view 
happiness as a zero-sum game due to their single-minded 
intent of maximizing their happiness in and through power. 
Following this objective, they may try to use the deeper and 
safer grasp of religions on subjects’ commitments without honoring their end of the bargain. They still 
may have to give something to hold or increase their power. But the importance of non-secular means of 
happiness may let them get away without conceding much or anything of secular value. This threatens to 
drive the power imbalance they wield to extremes. And, of course, their 
religious services are hollowed out by their secular or sectarian activities as 
well. Thus, they stand to substitute benevolent religious domination with 
selfishness, edging out their happiness at the cost of subjects’ happiness. 
In this process, they can build on the already existing objective of religions 
to minimize secular happiness. This objective springs by implication from 
the absolute priority of deities and the related subordination and servitude 
of humans. To optimize the benefits of gods pursuant to these objectives, 
rational principles concerning human happiness are only sanctioned to the 
extent they enable or do not distract from them. To effectively submit and 
serve, humans must be permitted to secure their existence and their means 
of service. But optimization of the relationship with gods requires humans 
to be limited to necessities of common 
pursuits so they will generate and deliver 
a maximum of services and goods to the 
deities. This is usually tolerated since gods are believed to compensate 
for the loss through divine rewards. The great majority of religious rules 
deals with these imagined benefits and the obligations for which they 
claim to compensate. Religious affirmations of human happiness are for 
these reasons typically sparse and cut to basics. Illegitimate conversions 
of religions pick up on this consensual reduction of secular happiness to 
justify the selfish maximization of their abuses.  
Followers may accept that limiting secular happiness entails the 
issuance of restrictive rules on objectives and pursuits. However, all too 
frequently, religions leave it at detailing these rules and only generally 
restate the common principles of happiness that remain still permitted 
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subject to these rules. Despite a clear shortage of practical guidance 
within this sanctioned space, one might argue that the inclusion of 
common rules of happiness by religions has surely advanced these 
rules. I think such an argument is mistaken. It appears unlikely that 
nobody would have thought of common principles to be good ideas 
before the religions stating them were conceived. It seems unlikely 
because general principles showing promise for elevating human 
happiness are commonsense principles. They can be simply derived 
from the human condition. And there is proof in many cases that 
they had been thought of in same or similar form where a certain 
religion was previously unfamiliar. Religions co-opted pre-existing 
ideas about happiness for several good reasons. Confirming existing 
attitudes of people religions courted as followers was important to 
avert conflict. It made authority they asserted more palatable by 
signaling they could be trusted in other principles they taught. Incorporating 
commonsense ideas would in addition have made them more relevant and 
complete. But another purpose was that religions had to include rules about 
commonsense ideas to effectively assert domination over them. Claiming 
universal application, they could not let secular happiness stay outside of 
that claim. They had to regulate secular happiness to be certain that secular 
ideas and practices were in conformance with their teachings and to root 
out sources for independent consideration and potential dissent. 
Soon, the assimilation of commonsense principles of happiness by 
religions made it appear they had come up with them and were the chief 
authority on them. The commonsense general nature of shared principles 
and the eagerness by religions to incorporate them made discussions about 
them initially unlikely. Still, there were bound to be questions and diverse 
views on or surrounding the incorporated commonsense principles and their practical applications. Such 
issues are often still subject to ongoing debates. This is so because common rules of human happiness by 
their nature do not describe ideas with much practical particularity. But 
most of such discussions had and still have to be conducted outside of 
religions. This is because rational analysis and independent thought do 
not mix well with belief-based dogma. Following their dogma, religions 
issue edicts how commonsense rules are to be interpreted. These edicts 
are not open to discussion. But chances are that they do not satisfactorily 
resolve the issues they address because their primary intent is to be true 
to and defend religious dogma. Dogmatic restrictiveness and defensive 
attitude have the innate tendency of erring on the side of caution. That 
seems to be especially so when it comes to secular happiness so as not 
to detract from the transcendental happiness that forms the dedicated 
focus of religions. The application of dogma to secular happiness then 
tends to prevent, delay, and constrict rational perception, consideration, 
and interpretation of basic propositions regarding human behavior.  
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Dogmatic strictures tend to aggravate circumstances of followers 
who already suffer from religious minimizations of their secular pursuits. 
Together, the transcendental minimization of secular happiness and the 
dogmatic interpretations of remaining common principles of happiness 
have led many religions to lose touch with everyday concerns and regular 
life. Followers are continually tempted to flout these limitations on their 
secular happiness because they contradict the urgencies and rationales 
of their natural needs, wishes, and pursuits. This can be counteracted by 
religious policing and punishment of noncompliance. But doing so may 
require a degree of intrusion that is either impossible to sustain or bound 
to meet popular resistance. Beyond that, the denial of secular happiness 
and the curbing of fundamental concerns may raise chronic discontent 
and opposition that religions may wish to avoid or at least minimize.  
To address these problems, religions may employ the preinstalled 
psychological mechanism of conscience, which causes followers to police 
and punish themselves. This natural mechanism deterring humans from 
conduct that causes unhappiness already is an important regular aspect 
of religions. However, religions may augment this mechanism to enhance 
compliance with their rules and secure their authority. They may do this 
by instilling a mindset that humans are weak by their nature and therefore 
prone to violating principles of good behavior. They may portray humans 
as incapable of living a successful life without religious prohibitions and 
guidance. They may institutionalize the problem of straying from correct 
behavior by labeling it chronically inherent in the human condition. This 
notion can be reinforced by their declaring an extensive catalog of normal 
human objectives and pursuits to be violations of religious mandates. The 
proscription of secular objectives and pursuits is then not only the reason 
why this control mechanism is necessary. It is also an integral part of making it work. This adds a perilous 
element of self-reinforcing ratcheting of restrictions. The oppressive fencing of prohibitions that religions 
tend to erect makes run-ins with it likely or even unavoidable. Such rules may serve to test followers’ 
dedication. They may also serve to intimidate followers by calling 
them out for violations. But more than that, oppressive rules help 
religions to institutionalize guilt in their subjects. Their difficulties 
or inabilities to live according to these rules consistently confirm 
perceptions of unalterable and continual inadequacy. These in 
turn institutionalize fear of punishment and prompt surrender to 
such punishment as unavoidable. The targeting of secular needs, 
wishes, and pursuits as violations of religious rules causes ongoing 
cycles of violation and resulting guilt. This is all the more so since 
suppression increases their urgency, which increases the chances 
they will find one way or another expression in human behavior. 
Unable to cope with these religious curtailments and their effects 
on their own, followers may be motivated to entrust themselves 
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to religious supervision, even in basic secular domains of their lives. 
They may be driven to subject themselves to, or to give in to religious 
demands for supervision, confession, repentance, and compensation 
to obtain absolution for inevitable transgressions. By such increased 
involvement and influence, religions can curb violations of their code 
and expand domination over their followers. 
This mechanism of guilt, admission, humiliation, and policing 
can control disallowed secular objectives and pursuits to an extent. 
However, their continual oppression combined with their built-in risk 
of escalation may increase the urgency of the suppressed attributes 
of happiness to levels calling for additional containment measures. 
This escalation seems inevitable since, however astute mechanisms 
for oppression might be, followers stay unnaturally intimidated and 
abridged in following natural objectives and pursuits. This discontent 
joins a related, general secular discontent concerning the demotion 
of humans and their happiness to sacrifice for and to serve religious 
overlords and their happiness. Followers see significant measures of their 
efforts and means that could have benefited them systematically redirected. 
They are aware that although these are earmarked to serve the happiness of 
gods, this happiness is largely administrated by religious administrations in 
their place. While they may approve of uses that assist the religion or that 
flow back into secular needs, they may also witness appropriation of their 
resources by clergy. They may have misgivings that the prerogative of gods’ 
happiness is exploited by their human representatives to enjoy a catered and 
protected existence. Religions may preempt related mistrust and criticism by 
disciplining representatives more harshly in their worldly happiness to focus 
their efforts more zealously on divine service. The dedication and fitness of 
clergy is thus regularly measured by renunciation of personal happiness and 
sacrifice for the purported greater happiness of serving deities. In this denial, 
they are not unique among followers 
but they are held to higher standards. 
While this may quiet reproach, the resulting burdens on clergy join 
underlying pressures of instrumentalization at lay levels to require 
enforcement beyond impositions of guilt. 
To maintain stability and to compensate for the organized 
deprivation of their administrators and subjects, religions have an 
ultimate tool at their disposal that by itself can assure victory. For 
this they focus attention on the most basic and prominent human 
need, the need to stay alive. They utilize the categorical denial of 
this need by inescapable death and the connected desperation and 
fear. They make a case that life after death is possible and promise 
such continued afterlife conditioned upon compliance with their 
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demands. They pair this promise with a threat of punishment in this or 
the promised afterlife in the event of a subject’s non-compliance. With 
this promise and threat looming, they may get their administrators and 
subjects to voluntarily subordinate their needs, wishes, and pursuits to 
the need and pursuit of ultimate survival. Since such ultimate survival 
is only available to those who genuflect to the mandates of the religion, 
these mandates become solidly entrenched. The ultimate importance 
of survival may relegate all other concerns of happiness and motivate 
followers to subordinate, curtail, or sacrifice their happiness if they are 
so instructed by a religion. Followers may devalue their own happiness 
and happiness of other humans. Depending on the severity of religious 
utilization, the depreciation of secular happiness may deteriorate to 
existential levels. Religions might engage such attitudes to encourage 
service to them. They may enhance commitment by leading followers 
to view their life as a trial stage whose purpose is to qualify for the promised veritable life. They may 
provide guidance on which services in derogation of followers’ happiness count toward that qualification. 
They may promise that righteous suffering in this life translates into an all the more glorious afterlife. This 
may prompt followers to do more than just lower the importance of their 
happiness. It may incite them to actively seek secular misery in sacrifice to 
earn such rewards. This is likely to spread misery to others in the process, 
either as a byproduct or in an effort to impose the same path to salvation 
on them. Thus, religions that once cared for ultimate happiness of current 
and potential followers can develop to produce opposite results for secular 
happiness. It can weaponize happiness to commit followers and make them 
willing to offer any, including their and other persons’ ultimate, sacrifice.  
Encouraging or insisting on dereliction of 
secular happiness and instead a perverse pursuit 
of secular unhappiness advances the potentials 
of religious privileges of absolute domination and 
instrumentalization of subjects to their logical conclusion. It may also connect 
religions back to a past when these potentials led to cruel practices of coercion, 
exclusion, or extinction. Current religions may try to distance themselves from 
such archaic practices. They may declare that they have reformed or represent 
a contrasting new beginning. But their reality may not or not sufficiently bear 
out these differentiations. There may be justification for claiming this is due to 
conversions or perversions of religions that do not keep with their teachings or 
intent. However, religions cannot be excused from such deviations because they 
may enable them. We already looked at organizational susceptibilities to secular 
and sectarian takeovers. Another danger is that the spiritual nature of religions 
attracts delusional minds who search for explanations for their experiences and 
who are likely to misinterpret religious guidance. Religious dogma may be open 
to erroneous interpretations, or a dogmatic apparatus may not stand up clearly 
enough to misinterpretations. Whatever the particular grounds might be, a long 
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history of religious enforcement and strife that reaches into current 
events stands witness to the destructive effects religions and their 
usurpations have had, and to some extent continue having, on the 
secular happiness and very existence of followers and others.  
It then becomes clear that religions possess a far-reaching 
array of tools to gain control of human longing for happiness and 
supersede or abuse secular happiness for their purposes. Whether 
and how they apply these utensils at their disposal may depend on 
their dogma, its management, and the resistance they encounter. It 
also depends on how much they have been able to foil conversion 
by secular or sectarian forces. Religions might not apply each of the 
described instruments, or not apply each to its maximum. They may 
give their subjects some leeway in carving out areas of secular happiness that are not tightly controlled. 
However, we can see that human happiness in its secular sense is not as important to religions as their 
assimilation of and to popular concerns, and their giving back of resources in the form of social services, 
might suggest. Most charitably, the contributions made by religious teachings to secular happiness can be 
described as rudimentary, unsurprising, and incomplete. Initially and over time, 
their assimilation and preaching of valid commonsense ideas might have given 
these ideas additional clout. However, overall, religious influence has been an 
obstacle to humanity’s development of rational principles of happiness. True to 
name, commonsense norms of happiness make common sense by themselves. 
They therefore would have naturally found growing acceptance and practice 
independent of their inclusion in religious teachings if rational discussion had 
been allowed let alone fostered. One cannot help but assume that humanity’s 
development and implementation of these principles would have been more 
advanced by now if their rational consideration had not been stifled by religions. 
The systematic demotion and deferral of human secular happiness by religions 
has damaged its understanding, appreciation, and pursuit for millennia.  
Religions may assert that such negative effects on secular happiness are insignificant compared 
to the additional sources for happiness revealed through the expansion of the human horizon into the 
divine. Such arguments speak to causes and experiences of happiness beyond those we can rationally 
know and consider. For this reason, they lie beyond the purview of philosophy 
of happiness. The review of religions in this presentation is therefore limited 
to possible and actual effects on secular happiness as a general phenomenon. 
None of my comments are directed toward the validity of spiritual beliefs or 
the happiness anybody might derive from such beliefs or their practice.  
And even my comments concerning religions’ correlations with and 
possible effects on secular happiness call for differentiation. “Religion” is an 
imprecise term and in other definitions may be more encompassing than the 
types of organizations that I have characterized. Material differences could be 
pointed out between religions that make my characterizations apply less or 
not at all. Not all religions have had opportunity or time to develop to display 
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the problems I described, and some may have been able to control them. But 
differentiation may also be due to their substance and related conduct. Some 
belief systems are less domineering and do not display problematic qualities 
I pointed out. Some may not be organized in manners that enable the sorts of 
developments I outlined. Some may set forth spiritual concepts or approaches 
that differ from the ones I described. Some may allow exchanges of views and 
rational argument concerning human happiness. They may contend or admit 
that humanity by its observable given nature is meant to freely live up to its 
potential, and not linger in subordination or servitude. They may reason that, 
however one might believe humanity came about, it seems difficult to argue 
that happiness is not part of the creative reality that led to us and leads us. 
They might ask why we were instilled in our creation with secular desires and 
capacities to build a better world if they were to be superseded by spiritual 
intervention. They may argue or concede our freedom to connect with and 
explore the creative logic of happiness in whichever way we find this works 
for us. They may ponder whether rational systems of happiness and spiritual 
systems can merge. Such belief systems that champion fulfillment of human 
potential may be categorized as spiritual philosophies or as humanist belief 
systems because they amalgamate rational aspects of, or a focus on, secular 
happiness with speculative elements. And even regarding those that include 
aspects of, or focus on, transcendental happiness, there is powerful evidence 
that they can have significantly constructive effects on secular happiness by 
inspiring good deeds that protect existential concerns. Their charitable work 
recurrently gives examples of some of humanity’s finest qualities.  
Still, however varied the stances and ambitions of religions regarding secular human happiness 
may be or may have been, history reveals religion overall as a blight on secular human happiness for as 
far back as records go. Admittedly, the negative effects have attenuated over time by internal reforms of 
religions and by the secularization of societies. But secular happiness is not likely to fully develop until 
humanity takes rational control of its concerns and develops sufficient self-confidence to master them. 
6. Philosophical Authorities on Philosophy of Happiness. 
To help us in this undertaking, we may look for rationally based authorities 
on happiness. We may hope to find them in academic philosophy, recalling 
what we have been told about it as standard bearer of enlightenment and 
humanism. And indeed, we can readily identify tendencies and movements 
in academic philosophy that have been instrumental in placing humanity 
and humans at the center of inquiry. Still, inadequacy in rational exploration 
is not restricted to popular and religious propositions concerning happiness. 
Theories of happiness in philosophy can and do limit themselves as well to 
favorite themes or tones, neglect aspects of happiness, claim commonsense 
insights as if they discovered them, and try to sell us on proposals that do 
not meet our desire for happiness. In many ways, such discussions are just 
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haughtier versions of their self-help cousins, hiding their prejudices and 
incompetence under a mantle of purported scientific respectability. But 
then again, they also have surprisingly much in common with a religious 
approach. A first sign of this is the strange persistence of philosophies of 
happiness through the ages up to current times with no or little change 
in these philosophies or attitudes toward them.  
Arguably, this could be based on the fact that these philosophies 
of happiness are ageless for the ages and nothing about them warrants 
criticizing, adjusting, or developing. However, this is not what I observed. 
I observed a virtually complete absence of serious attempts to do any of 
the like. In contrast to other sciences, I could not see any sustained effort 
to improve the philosophy of happiness by developing it or superseding 
simpler or incorrect treatments of subjects with better insights. This does 
not mean that academic philosophy of happiness has not accomplished a progression of thought. It did 
occur because later philosophers considered work of their predecessors. But in very few instances is this 
progression documented to scientific points of actual advancement that improve on prior stages or leave 
them behind. Rather, authorities stand typically detached adjacent to all that came before and followed. 
Apparently, philosophers and their works, once they entered the pantheon 
of authority, became untouchable. Serious investigations into the relevance 
of their statements have been replaced, if they ever existed, with inferences 
of relevance based on that they made them. This pantheon of recognized 
authorities has been closely protected by a small community of academic 
gatekeepers who have been resolutely opposed to seriously criticizing any 
of its members and only accepting new pantheon members and gatekeepers 
who agree. As a result, philosophical treatments of philosophical authorities 
mostly bow to them in great reverence, keep them enshrined, and only dare 
to add translations, respectful comparisons, or interpretations to fix gaffs or 
gaps. Similar to the administration of religious belief systems, the principal 
objective of philosophical gatekeeping regarding happiness appears to be a 
defense of the authority and the purity of its teachings at any cost. 
With this restrictive stance, institutional philosophy has become a 
musty, rationally disguised religion in its small, sequestered world, 
complete with gods, priests, dogmas, denominations, seminaries, 
confirmations, and ordinations. Its loyal canonization of venerated 
philosophical authorities and teachings has stifled discussion and 
progression regarding the philosophy of happiness. In comparison 
with religious belief systems, this has occurred with a less open but 
not any less effective passive-aggressive enforcement. As a chosen 
consequence, academic philosophy has generally reduced itself on 
the subject of happiness to endlessly ruminating and teaching its 
history. For any other theoretical or practical concern, philosophy 
of happiness is a dead science, if it ever was alive. All arguments in 
self-interested justification to the contrary fail for lack of evidence.  
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This self-disqualification of the philosophy of happiness as conglomerate 
of quasi-religions might in some respects be connected to the self-preservation of 
its institutions and their representatives. But it also has an important tradition in 
the circumstance that philosophy of happiness has had a most difficult time over 
the millennia to rid itself of religious domination and interference. Until recently, 
rational arguments had to be consistently and carefully clad in religious sourcing 
and affirmation to keep their authors out of trouble and to give their assertions 
any chance of finding consideration and acceptance. There is also broad indication 
that philosophers themselves restricted and filtered their thoughts and findings 
through the optics of the religions they embraced. Others were theologians and 
developed philosophical thoughts based on their belief systems. A third variety of 
philosophers established, intentionally or unintentionally, new religions or creeds. 
Even attempts to escape religious control were frequently affected by religious 
principles in that such attempts deemed it necessary to assume drastically opposing stances of beliefs to 
overcome religious control. By the sum of these religious influences, beliefs restrained and skewed the 
philosophy of happiness as a rational science and kept it from developing. By the time the philosophy of 
happiness had a healthier chance of developing independently, the traditions of philosophical institutions 
had already been firmly established. This explains in part why it continued 
in the same canonized vein by only selectively including contributions that 
developed within its traditions and did not rock the boat of past teachings. 
Some may argue that, regardless of the past problems and current 
state of a philosophy of happiness, there is a prolific and long tradition of 
venerated minds deeply searching and thinking about rational answers to 
problems of happiness. Why should we not trust them to have discovered 
most or all of the answers when they and many others say they did? I once 
had those exact convictions and attitudes as well. I believed in the ordering 
powers of philosophy. However, my exhaustive search for theoretical and 
practical guidance on happiness among these supposedly great authorities 
resulted in almost complete disappointment. A disappointment so great 
that it caused me to lose interest in philosophy altogether for some time. 
Let me tell you how this disappointment came about. When I started 
studying philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, I did that in support of my 
legal studies, not to find any answers regarding happiness. I was interested in 
philosophical foundations of laws and legal systems, going by the name of legal 
theory or philosophy of law. And I found these foundations of law in my studies 
of philosophy. But I rapidly understood that many of my fellow students were 
studying philosophy to find answers to questions about their lives, were looking 
for, if not specific answers, at least for a guiding framework. I recall my favorite 
professor responding to that expectation, stating in an introductory course that 
philosophy does not provide such guiding substance. Rather, he said, it teaches 
us analytical tools, mental flexibility, and tolerance for the validity of alternative 
approaches. I liked the mental gymnastics aspect. But philosophy not offering 
Gaudapada  
(ca. 6th century) 
Georg W. F. Hegel  
(1770-1831) 
George Orwell  
(1903-1950) 
Text © 2020 by Martin Janello                                                                  24                                     
 
substantive answers to humanity’s problems seemed to betray what I had 
been told throughout my life previously. I had grown up with the idea that 
philosophy was the fountain of wisdom for the improvement of the human 
condition. I had thought of legal organization as an important part to this 
improvement. But if there were no substantive values at the basis of legal 
arrangements, they could easily decline into detrimental states of all sorts. 
This concern made me realize that my interest in philosophy motivated by 
legal concerns had to be at its core an interest in human happiness. I could 
not accept the professor’s pronouncement and was determined to prove 
him wrong. In following years, I read every book and article I could find on 
the philosophy of happiness in the library of the Philosophical Seminary, at 
times branching out to the Theological Seminary nearby. Along the way, I 
became friends with the lady guarding the library entrance in the evening and the janitor assuring nobody 
was locked in at closing. But as much as I tried, nothing I read impressed me that philosophy had produced 
an authoritative understanding of happiness beyond rudimentary concerns at the basis of legal order.  
One of the most surprising results of my intense research was that 
philosophers could rarely agree on a definition of happiness. Many recited 
obvious basics. But almost as many discussed these basics only to derive or 
validate reductions, particularizations, perversions, and exaggerations they 
could use to build idiosyncratic versions of happiness. Others did not dwell 
on fundamentals, advancing straight to favored premises and explanations. 
Reading these definitions suggested to me they were competing who could 
come up with the most eccentric distancing from experiences of happiness. 
Many of them made a point claiming regular experiences do not qualify as 
happiness or at best at a lower echelon. It was therefore not very surprising 
that the authorities coining these disparate definitions would arrive at very 
different, often absurd instructions on reaching or maintaining happiness.  
Another result of my research was that apparent summaries in secondary references were often 
pretty much all there was to the original texts. The reasons for this were many times not to be found in 
their authors’ intent. Rather, I discovered that sadly scores of texts authored by acknowledged authorities 
had not survived. At times, the only way one would know about these texts or even their authors is by 
reference or citation in other authors’ writings that did survive. One can only 
speculate about the loss humankind incurred from losing these texts. However, 
to the extent there was a record of the titles or subject matters of these texts, I 
could not see much of a loss for purposes of my research. And reading surviving 
fragments and attempts to piece them together to a philosophy did not impress 
me either. On the contrary, it made me wonder why so much attention has been 
given to them by institutional philosophy. I suspected this was due to a transfer 
of status from famous philosophers who cited them. Even where classic or other 
works were intact, most addressed issues of happiness in summary fashion. For 
commonsense principles, this was par for the course. But most authorities were 
not content stating those but tried to add a twist or derivative theory. However, 
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they did not bother much with legitimization or expression of their premises, 
working out their arguments, or consequences of their theories. Rather, most 
introduced nonobvious premises for their theories, or theories themselves, as 
plainly observable truths. Numerous stances were not clearly expressed, many 
arguments never completed or advanced to a full theory. Thus, their modifying 
or additional points appeared like cursory outlines of ideas. In many instances, 
the fragmentary and poorly constructed arguments destroyed any credibility 
that their authors’ recognition of commonsense general principles might have 
built. Credibility was also diluted by a pervasive failure to establish reasonable 
connections of philosophies of happiness to a universe of general principles, 
beyond some of them that were picked and interpreted in support. Reading 
these treatments of happiness made me wonder how they could have risen to 
such prominence and reverence in philosophical circles. 
Then I found quite a number of philosophers who thought to have discovered the key to happiness 
in one or a few aspects of the human experience or in certain virtues. Quite a number of them seemed to 
give such arguments their all, writing extensively, at times obsessively, to demonstrate the reasonability 
of their partiality. Often, a reasonable argument might be made that there was 
something to what they advocated. Some were even brilliant in analyzing and 
describing subjects of their research. But their quite obviously unsupportable 
insistence that this relatively narrow slice was the whole pie or close to it, and 
their desertion and disregard of major aspects of human happiness made them 
appear pitifully limited. Here again, I wondered how such obviously deficient 
theories could find reception, respect, and even applause. 
Still, such miscues could not equal works by acknowledged authorities 
that, with exception maybe of a few hints regarding their general concepts and 
intent, just did not make sense or were so ambiguous that they could serve as 
grounds for incongruent varieties of interpretations. Stylistically convoluted, 
bizarre or undefined in their language, and devoid of serious attempts to make 
themselves understood, these ramblings made me question their seriousness 
and the sanity of their authors. Reading their translations into other languages confirmed an exponential 
compounding of their mystery for readers. The enormous difficulty or sheer impossibility of deciphering 
much of what these texts state has protected them from criticism. It has also 
protected those who claim to understand them, making others who honestly 
cannot fathom these writings feel like there must be something wrong with 
their intellect or learning. For fear of being branded as imperceptive, honest 
readers are tempted to chime in with those who falsely claim to comprehend 
the works. They might even elevate their pretense and take advantage of the 
confusion by feigning additional insights in attempts to acquire indisputable 
cachet. As the number of disingenuous scholars and readers increases, soon 
nobody might be left with the courage or standing to state the truth. Or many 
who know better keep silent since the vague, incomprehensible, and absurd 
cannot be intelligently discussed. The result is vain foolishness, not science. 
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Reviewing these works or fragments of works, I could not 
help noticing that a sizeable share of the philosophical authorities 
had failed for whatever reason to sufficiently state or support their 
theories or even ideas on happiness. For some this was an obvious 
side issue they came across in other pursuits and felt compelled to 
remark something about in passing. But, surprisingly, others who 
made happiness an important ingredient or the focal point of their 
attention also allowed themselves shortcuts in their premises and 
deductions. Their apparent reliance in assertions about happiness 
on their personal impressions and hearsay of their own authority 
disqualifies their attempted contributions as opinions. Interesting 
as they might be, they fall short of the requisite that extraordinary 
claims must be backed by extraordinary evidence, including clarity 
of such evidence. Others may grant to such authors more benefits of the 
doubt. They may pick through works to construe something worthwhile 
where their authors could not be troubled, or were incapable of, doing 
so. Some secondary writers have made careers from trying to join loose 
ends, fill voids, or reconcile contradictions through interpretations and 
reasoned speculations. Valiant as these attempts might be, they cannot 
make a sensible whole of something ill-conceived or incomplete. 
Without doubt, some traditional philosophical authorities offer 
general insights and principles that could be, and some of which have 
proven, beneficial. But having a significant philosopher state them does 
not add to them because they are observations of common phenomena 
and derivative commonsense considerations. Like in religious doctrine, 
these observations and considerations 
are nothing more than restatements of 
principles that were preexisting in some 
expression and tradition. As beneficial 
as collecting and stating such general insights might be, they do not mend 
unknown holes in human knowledge. Arguably, the restatement of basic 
principles by philosophical greats added authority to these statements. 
In that sense, philosophy may claim to have added to human organization 
around basic needs. However, this involved a process across the span of 
human civilization in which incomplete, incorrect, and rough statements 
of fundamental principles cumulatively began to show definition. Though 
far from perfect, this contributory genesis was to be preferred to enable 
the emergence of common basic principles in the definition and pursuit 
of happiness. Too much authority along the way could have cast it into a 
mold that could have hindered or blocked its development. And in a few 
cases philosophical authority did have this effect temporarily. Deference 
to authority might have kept, and during some periods did keep, subjects 
from questioning its statements and from referring to their own general 
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experiences and considerations as comparable humans. The restatements 
of commonsense observations and derivative principles by acknowledged 
philosophical authorities could then have been counterproductive.  
As it was, the commonsense nature of basic principles was mostly 
able to break through faulty interpretations and leave them behind. Where 
statements by philosophical authorities regarding fundamental principles 
are apposite, their general nature does not tell us much beyond basics of 
happiness. Their usefulness is exhausted by cataloging the common nature 
of humans, including their basic needs, wishes, and pursuits, and deriving 
therefrom the foundations for individual and social organization. Individual 
organizational foundations are about the essentials of arranging needs and 
wishes and their pursuit in a setting marked by individual effort. The social 
organizational foundations include a basic legal order and basic rights and 
obligations that are derived from the common nature of humans. As 
important as these principles are, their commonsense nature made 
them easily detectable, especially for professionals looking for them. 
Nevertheless, it took philosophy millennia to collect these insights to 
some level of maturity and systematic classification. This may suggest 
that philosophy did more to misguide or hinder human development 
than contributing to it. But this suggestion may grant philosophy too 
much credit for affecting humanity’s development. Apart from some 
temporary exceptions, it appears to have been ignored in the past as 
much as it is unnoticed today. Then again, even if it did not have much 
authority over how humans acted at any time, it could have arranged 
itself to speak clearly with a common voice on basic human rights and 
obligations. That this did not happen for such a long time until rather 
recently speaks volumes about institutionalized philosophy of happiness. In fact, it supports significant 
indications that these principles have become widely recognized and entrenched by action of other social 
forces, and only were picked up by philosophy as signs of the times. Still, social movements may have 
benefitted from the reinjection and voicing of their concerns and possible solutions through philosophies.  
We may then give some credit to recognized philosophies 
of happiness for humanity’s advancement toward a vital milestone, 
even if their contribution was slow and marred by misdirection. But 
we should further acknowledge that this is merely the starting point 
in the liberation and empowerment of individuals to dream and to 
pursue their dreams. Basic principles are by their nature not much 
addressed to assisting us in selecting our objectives and pursuits as 
individuals beyond commonalities. In this respect, philosophies of 
happiness have given even less guidance. In as far as philosophies 
focusing on human basics have commented on individual pursuits, 
this occurs mostly in arguments identifying them as building blocks 
of a societal scheme, to describe them as examples of aberrations 
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from favored practices, or to prove a point of philosophy not for their 
individual sake. Despite some acknowledgement of individual aspects 
to happiness, the institutional philosophy of happiness has thus failed 
to significantly contribute to helping individuals in developing them.  
The poor performance of philosophy in advancing philosophy 
of happiness has not kept it from regularly congratulating itself on the 
subject. Despite the various shortcomings of philosophical writings on 
happiness, a limited number of them are endlessly cited, interpreted, 
listed, and compared in academic circles for their incestuous purposes 
or to elicit interest in non-academics. This frequently involves claimed 
actualizations of classic philosophies by more contemporary beliefs or 
insights. Few months pass by without an embellished rechewing of the 
usual theories that never had much taste to begin with. This seemingly 
endless caravan of iterations what philosophers or confirming current authorities claim to have found out 
about happiness evidences how little they bear upon our reality and are able to advise on it now. There is 
good reason why most recited philosophies failed to find traction outside 
academic or selected other circles and remain largely inconsequential. The 
real world has passed on, and passed by, these philosophies. They will never 
earn much acclaim there because they are patchy, trivial, or unrealistic.  
For those new to these purported authorities on happiness, it may 
be of some initial interest to find out what famous philosophers have said 
about happiness. And it may be cool to tell others about what one read to 
take and hold one’s place in an educated conversation. But think about this: 
If there was practical substance to any of these classic teachings or claimed 
actualizations, why are they not widely practiced after leads of hundreds or 
sometimes thousands of years? Why do they require desperate repetitive 
marketing? Where is the result of any of them in the real world, in the lives 
of people, in their happiness? I have not heard of anybody saying, “I read 
about this philosophy, applied what I read, and am so much happier now.” And why is it that we see the 
same old philosophies of at least the last two and a half thousand years 
regurgitated and compared without any serious attempt of developing 
them? Does that fact not bespeak that they are dead ends incapable of 
development? These stale, geriatric philosophies still carry a historical 
interest and may provide plentiful material for further research by such 
interests. But for someone trying to find a philosophy of happiness that 
gives practical guidance, these teachings are with very few exceptions 
a thorough waste of time and effort. They are intellectual placebos that 
cannot address the malady of human unhappiness. Apparently, many 
who have sampled the classics have arrived at this realization. This is 
why these philosophers and their works on how a human life should be 
organized are largely missing from contemporary discourse and why so 
many who look for answers are turning to other authorities.  
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No harm no foul then. But this is not the entire history or present of 
philosophy of happiness. Philosophies that actually did or do have effects are 
regularly excluded from philosophical showboat reviews since they did not do 
well for humanity. These black sheep in the philosophy of happiness family are 
called ideologies. Their source is a conviction that other people should be like 
their creators and promoters or should adopt what these deem worthwhile 
objectives and pursuits. Although ideologies reflect subjective mindsets and 
preferences, they are comprehensive teachings that seem to have answers for 
all or most issues of human existence. If an ideology does not already contain 
comprehensive coverage of its subjects’ concerns at its creation, it regularly 
develops such coverage. It does this to disguise its subjectivity and to prevent 
subjects from turning to their own judgment or to other influences. To assist 
themselves with this objective, ideologies embed idiosyncratic philosophies of 
what happiness is and how it should be pursued in generally acceptable ideas. 
But they spin them into directions or add to them in self-serving ways. To not 
give away the subjective character of their spin, they regularly attempt to sell 
it as a general principle or a derivative of recognized general principles. Only 
some may openly advocate others comply with their idiosyncratic standards. 
They may be able to afford this if they can attract followers by qualities that 
make followers long to be like or with charismatic creators or spokespersons 
of an ideology, or if they long to be part of an ideology’s membership.  
However ideologies may ingratiate themselves, they are intrinsically 
flawed because they dismiss and try to override the extensive uniqueness of 
happiness. For the sake of justifying their idea of a larger system, they have to 
fight the idea that happiness is subjective and individual in nature. They must 
fight the notion that telling others what happiness is and how to pursue it is 
denying them their individual dignity and reality. To attend to the subjective 
ideas of their creators or promoters, they must convincingly argue happiness 
can be found in conformance with their subjective ideas as common ideals. 
Set on suppressing or manipulating us toward that objective, ideologies are 
keen on preventing subjects from unfolding distinct paths toward happiness. 
They may therefore induce or preserve conditions that keep us preoccupied 
with securing our existential requirements. Even by placing or keeping us in 
apprehension of insecurity regarding fundamental needs, they may have us 
switch to an emergency mode in which we give up on our particularities and 
fall in line. Understanding and controlling common fears and desires enables 
ideologies to make masses of subjects think, feel, and act according to their 
ideas. Ideologies take hold by suggesting to address our existential concerns 
through their ideas. To supplement their domination of our ways, they often 
suggest that individualized pursuits of happiness are pointless or harmful. Or 
they try to funnel or shape the individuality of our pursuits into conforming 
activities. They may also use archaic tribal and hierarchic notions that make 
us subordinate to and serve the greater good they purport to represent. 
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The essential lie of ideologies in trying to sell their subjective stance 
as generally indicated, objective truth makes them worthless. It also makes 
them dangerous because it produces oppressive ideas. Followers are likely 
to believe that people who disagree just have not seen the light of what is 
good for them and can justifiably be forced into happiness. Or they may 
turn the idea against themselves and resolve to subject themselves for their 
own good to the objectives and pursuits of an ideology even against their 
inclinations. Thus, ideologies incite zeal to convert oneself and others. They 
must do this because their objective is a practical implementation of their 
vision, and achieving this by artificial alignment demands comprehensive 
domination and management. It is then not a coincidence that ideological 
ambitions, strategies, and potentials resemble those of religions. To assert 
a comprehensive coverage of all concerns of their subjects, ideologies must 
not only suppress, but fundamentally replace, religions as contenders. To succeed at this, but also as a 
matter of their own dynamics resulting from their claim to power, ideologies tend to organize and act a 
lot like some religions. Their foundation and organization by a visionary and a select number of promoting 
individuals who build and administrate a comprehensive control apparatus 
to implement their doctrine closely resemble the hierarchy of some religions. 
And like some religions, ideologies are susceptible to be hijacked by interests 
intent on abusing ideologies for their personal interests. In this usurpation, 
impostors can take advantage of the fact that the underlying philosophies of 
ideological movements and these movements themselves already constitute 
reflections of subjective viewpoints claiming objective applicability. They can 
therefore rather easily assume power under a pretense of perpetuating the 
ideology or saving it against internal or external enemies. They may use gaps, 
limits, or ambiguities in the original dogma to expand or fill these with their 
ideas, at times perverting ideologies or propelling them to extremes. Or they 
may introduce more efficient or effective ways to exert power.  
In an ultimate semblance to religions, and as a direct consequence of 
their thriving on exigencies, ideologies have divided humanity in tribal camps 
that are ill-disposed to one another without much ability to reach out across 
dividing lines. Their members are largely locked into their ideologies because 
their stances are not based on their sound judgment, but dogma that does not 
allow them to think or feel independently for themselves. This separation not 
only prevents people from cooperating. It also creates the source for endless 
conflicts in the defense of the dogmas and tribes formed around them. This is 
particularly so because ideological dogmas claim absolute truth. They cannot 
admit that there are other ways to define and pursue happiness, because this 
is the essence of their claim to power. Resulting adversities are not dreaded 
but welcomed by ideologies because they cement the exigencies they require 
to obtain and maintain their hold over subjects. Their insistence has cost humanity a persistent denial of 
happiness, and has inflicted pervasive misery and death. Even where an ideology is able to implement its 
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ideas undisturbed, these consequences tend to follow. They may follow even 
more severely because an ideology in this situation possesses the luxury of 
implementing its subjectivities to their bitter end. The assertions by authors 
of ideologies that they are bound to result in happiness for subjects assumes 
responsibility for the happiness of these subjects. This raises a duty in these 
authors to foresee and forecast negative potentials of their ideologies and to 
close the door on such potentials even if they benevolently believe the world 
can benefit from their ways. Authors of ideologies regularly fail such caution 
or courage to describe possible or actual downsides of their ideologies. Their 
failure may be due to lack of impartiality that led them to conceive of their 
ideology in the first place, and the resulting lack of foresight. But it may also 
arise because they quite rightly fear that raising caveats would weaken the 
adoption of their ideologies. So instead of creating ideologies that might be manageable because they 
incorporate some elements of truth, they bring to life monstrosities. By this lack of self-criticism, most 
ideologies become unviable and destroy any chance of lasting influence. 
This chance seems slim to begin with. Because of their idiosyncrasies, the 
required numbers of followers may not materialize. Even if they succeed, 
followers will find out sooner or later that the represented objectives and 
pursuits do not match theirs. Ideologies may then follow an inherent logic 
of burning out. This may occur by gradual decline and peaceful transition 
to a more popular movement. All too often, though, ideologies continue 
their rigid trajectory and burn out in an inferno of their insistence.  
Even where such consequences have not yet occurred, ideologies 
are systemically incapable of improving the happiness of their followers. 
The benefits they might offer come at a disproportionately high cost even 
under the best circumstances because of what ideologies require for their 
own sake. In many ways, they resemble religions without the dimension 
of transcendental happiness. Their negative effects compound for people 
outside of the ideologies who have to endure their overbearing nature as 
adversaries. Intentionally or unintentionally, they serve somebody else’s 
needs and wishes first. Subjects’ needs and wishes are regularly allowed 
only in conformance with ideologies. This may not be by direct mandate 
and enforcement, but indirectly by way of settings ideologies create for 
individuals within which to pursue their happiness. Subjects may be self-
policing to get along and not imperil the happiness and security they have 
achieved or can achieve in the system. This may reserve intervention by 
the system to disturbances that do not resolve themselves at the subject 
level. More advanced ideologies also permit subjects to carve out pieces 
of self-determination in some aspects of happiness that do not contradict 
the system or are negligible to it. This creates valves for unhappiness that 
subjects experience from compliance against their wishes. And it serves 
as distraction to the detection of and resistance to a regime’s oppressive 
nature. It permits systems to claim with superficial justification subjects 
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are able to secure happiness their own way within the system. The indirect 
nature of a system together with the small pieces of freedom it allows may 
help to make subjects lose sight of how firmly embedded they truly are. If 
managed sensibly, such strategies can add to the longevity of an ideology 
until the system encounters or produces conditions that reveal substantial 
differences of objectives and pursuits between the regime and its subjects. 
But clever strategies are not the only reasons why ideologies about 
happiness have successfully managed to run our lives in major aspects. The 
main reason is that we not only let them into the door, but welcome them. 
We do this because our happiness is our encompassing, overarching prime 
need. We chronically thirst for happiness and our inability to create or keep 
enough happiness may drive us into the arms of an ideology that promises 
to make it all good. When calamities strike that deprive us of the fulfillment 
of existential needs or we suffer fear of such deprivation, ideologies find even the more self-reliant of us 
at our most vulnerable. These are moments when we are most ready to hand over the reigns over our life 
to someone who credibly promises to fix things. We already discussed that these dynamics encourage 
ideologies to create or perpetuate endangerment and its actualization. 
They may do so primarily to offer themselves as saviors. And these may 
succeed distracting us from our paths to happiness because there are now 
more pressing problems we need to solve. However, such intrigues may 
be unnecessary and their grand scale makes them difficult to implement 
anyway unless an ideology has already ascended to power. It seems much 
more widespread that ideologies emerge when, or bide their time until, 
calamities arise from extraneous sources. And even in the absence of a 
notable calamity, we may be receptive to the lure of ideologies. We may 
consider them because we always look for a better life and ideologies try 
to make us believe they have it all figured out for us. This becomes more 
likely if we identify parts of their teachings as applicable to us or parts of 
their system as helpful. We may concede some tradeoffs or baggage that 
trail along if an ideology seems capable 
of helping us produce happiness in sizeable ranges of our concerns. And 
we may like the idea that all concerns are taken care of in an ideology 
even if we will have to press ourselves into its mold to meet this goal. 
Ideologies might need this attractant to establish their rule because no 
sufficient exigency exists or can be created. They might at least initially 
play to these concerns, which tend to hide their less agreeable aspects, 
risks, and ultimate intent. They may encounter diminished thresholds in 
people looking for guidance to subject themselves willingly or allowing 
ideologies to take over. However, once we allow a system to take hold 
that obstructs or prevents our choices in parts where we disagree, we 
have sold parts of our souls. We might think we will be able to examine 
and modify the system or remove us from it and pursue our own path if 
we deem the price becoming too high down the road. The problem with 
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this is often that systems may charge a discouraging high price for not going along 
or forbid noncompliance altogether. Then again, we may already have resigned to 
continue in a system after becoming embedded in it since extracting ourselves from 
it might be too painful or if there is no viable alternative for us outside the system. 
All these issues suggest that following ideologies originating in the minds of 
others is generally a foul idea to pursue one’s happiness. Once we understand the 
track record of ideologies, it may not take much more to have us realize that they 
cannot lead us toward happiness, at least not the best happiness we can reasonably 
imagine. But what alternative is there beyond the sources we already considered? 
Maybe we need to replace our emotional intuition with scientific evidence. 
7. Happiness Studies by Sciences Beyond Philosophy. 
Relatively recently, sources cited as authorities on the subject of happiness have included contributions 
from empirical sciences beyond philosophy. True to their creed, these so-called “happiness studies” try to 
define happiness in ways that can be quantified and qualified. Because of their sourcing in science, they 
promise objective insights into happiness. Their claimed innovation gave hope, and for a number of years 
the media were filled with their findings, and best-selling books about them were flying off the shelves.  
The big hoopla about this purported new science made me look 
at its approaches intensely. I was hoping it might give me answers where 
self-help recipes, religious teachings, and institutional philosophy failed. 
But this optimism did not bear out because happiness studies make the 
same cardinal mistake the failed prior approaches have made. They are 
not giving sufficient credit to the fact that happiness is a highly complex 
personal and idiosyncratic experience that hinges on a myriad of factors 
in each individual’s past, present, and expectations for the future. This 
reality of happiness simply does not lend itself to the kind of abstractions 
happiness studies are trying to establish. Trying to ignore this accuracy 
problem, they attempt to classify and measure experiences of happiness 
and their causes and to derive generally 
relevant principles. They only seemingly 
achieve success in this because their objective of generalization coincides 
with the coarse and blunt approach of which they are capable at this time, 
and which they must follow to make any applicable statement. In other 
words, an empirical scientific approach can currently only survey human 
happiness from generalized viewpoints and can only provide generalized 
results. It has to generalize disparate individuals and their circumstances 
into common categories to be able to compile and evaluate data elicited 
about happiness. The best results this can yield are general types, ranges, 
or averages of reactions to causes or types of causes. A realization of this 
limitation seems to have been the main cause why the widespread initial 
enthusiasm that empirical sciences could significantly contribute to an 
understanding and improvement of happiness has quickly faded. 
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The underlying reason for this limitation is that the objects of study are 
intertwined with an entireness of exterior and interior circumstances of persons 
and subject to interactions between these circumstances. These individual sets of 
circumstances and interactions constitute diversified settings in which happiness 
studies try to quantify or qualify occurrences of happiness. The vast particularities 
of these entireties stand to affect the happiness or unhappiness individuals draw 
from particularized events or situations. And because these entireties are likely to 
vary from person to person, they stand to affect their happiness or unhappiness 
differently. But happiness studies do not possess a sufficient understanding how 
the details of such entireties of settings affect results they are trying to assess. All 
they can do is assess partial or complete commonalities of the human machine of 
happiness. This works well for fundamental, common needs and wishes and the commonsense principles 
humans have already derived and of which they can be accurately aware by their own observations and 
insight. But it does not work well at all for higher hanging fruit of insight about our personal happiness of 
which we may not already know. Happiness science inquiries into these areas have to 
allow for possibilities of and deviations by idiosyncrasies in their descriptions of results. 
To say anything approximately valid about personal happiness at all, happiness studies 
must generalize something distinctly individual. They must operate within margins that 
allow for great varieties of possibly changing circumstances to be included. Happiness 
studies might try to order and narrow this variety of circumstances for which they must 
make allowances by types of circumstances whose presence or absence they assess. 
But there are multitudes of types, selections, constellations, and possible interactions 
of relevant circumstances. Many cannot be excluded since they are regularly present 
in humans, just not likely in same or similar articulations or configurations. Including 
them despite variances does not advance the accuracy of happiness studies much. And 
marking differentiations among the various types, constellations, and possible interactions of relevant 
circumstances as relevant particularities causes countervailing loss of general authority. And it still must 
sacrifice exactitude since many remaining dissimilarities must remain grouped together. This may make 
us question the justification for differentiation. But without it, generalizations fall flat as commonplaces. 
The most this typology allows is to show general correlations of 
some very few types of individual circumstances. So happiness science 
might be able to describe universal or weighted relationships between 
selected causes and effects. It also might describe in general terms the 
dynamics of what happens at what rate when we add or subtract one or 
the other circumstance. But it cannot establish useful answers beyond 
pointing out general relationships between a few crudely circumscribed 
causes and effects. It cannot tell us how we might cope with our much 
more complex reality of human happiness. As a new science, this may 
be all it can try to do at this time. Maybe someday there will be a way to 
account for and to comprehend every factor and occurrence entering 
individual happiness and unhappiness. But with currently primitive tools and methods, happiness science 
cannot tackle this complexity. What are these tools and methods and why are they so imprecise? Answers 
to these questions emerge when we review the practical challenges which happiness science must face.       
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One intractable problem happiness studies face is making certain 
that circumstances or events they observe can be controlled or otherwise 
standardized. Already occurring circumstances, events, and constellations 
among them may be too untidy. In real life, external occurrences and their 
results may overlap with other occurrences and their results and may play 
out differently depending on such overlap. And how subjects perceive and 
react to them is bound to be as different as individuals and their previous 
and concurrent experiences. To reduce this complexity, happiness science 
may conduct experiments in which defined circumstances are introduced 
to selected individuals who carry certain characteristics. The experimental 
constellations may progress to add or subtract factors so that the bearing 
of each can be studied. But what really can be extracted from the isolation 
of occurrences if it introduces artificiality into the experiment. Subjects 
may react differently if they can distinguish the experiment from real life. 
Beyond that, reactions to isolated events may be very different because real-life events do not typically 
occur in isolation. Even if such isolation could be created for the moment, 
the overlap of occurrences before the experimental isolation may not be 
controllable in their lingering effects on the subject. More realistic insights 
might be gained by introducing real events into real life. But then we are 
back to the messy disorder that makes it difficult to ascertain causes and 
effects. Even selecting individuals for their similarity threatens to introduce 
too many remaining variables into observations to draw conclusions that 
exceed the mundane. Similar individuals may still carry so many interfering 
distinctions that results must still be generalized. If sufficient similarity can 
be established, selecting similar individuals diminishes the applicability of 
conclusions to dissimilar individuals. And how do we determine and gauge 
relevant similarities and dissimilarities in the first place? It appears we run 
into the same problems we encounter with nonexperimental research. 
Both external and personal circumstances seem to possess too 
many variables among individuals that in themselves are subjected to 
variability to find out anything beyond very rough conclusions, even in 
experimental settings. Without having studied these variables, and the 
differences in the presence and articulation of variables probable to be 
different for and in each person and constitute moving targets within 
persons, one does not know which ones influence the outcome in what 
way. This is of course the objective of research and experimentation, 
but one would need at least some of this clarity beforehand to create 
studies that can draw useful conclusions. And what conclusions can one 
reasonably expect to make even if one has ascertained all participating 
factors. And what are we even measuring? Are we looking for absolutes 
or relative quantifications? How can we detect common denominators 
among persons? And how do we compare their measurements? These 
issues beg a larger question what happiness science can accomplish.  
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Of course, one could study humans like one would study an animal 
in its natural habitat. This approach is nothing new. But such studies deal 
with simpler subjects and circumstances and aim lower in the knowledge 
they wish to distill from their studies. Happiness of animals stands to differ 
from the happiness of humans as a consequence of both physiological and 
environmental differences. While some animals display happiness in ways 
humans can recognize, the happiness of most animals may be determined 
by whether they diverge from their ordinary behavior, have a lesser than 
average life span, or exhibit physiological changes. These are important 
pointers regarding human happiness. But the complexities of humans, their 
happiness, and their circumstances far exceed the parameters of animal 
studies. One would be hard pressed to define humans’ natural habitat and 
their typical behavior in it because they live in so many different areas and 
conditions, undertake so many different, specialized activities, and because 
they have augmented mental capacities that can react in so many ways 
to a great variety of influences. Whether as a cause or as a consequence, 
differentiations among humans as individuals are generally much more 
pronounced than among individual animals. And so is what makes them 
happy or unhappy, how happy or unhappy it makes them, and how life 
aspects work together to determine overall happiness or unhappiness.  
Still, empirical happiness researchers seem to believe they can 
draw some valuable conclusions about human happiness from analyzing 
cumulative data. This belief is based on the fact that, as members of the 
same species, humans share fundamentals of how they must, and how 
they like, to live their lives. The belief that useful insights can be obtained 
seems supported by the facts that humans can reflect on their happiness 
and can communicate about it in absolute and relative terms. Based on 
these abilities, happiness studies are putting their subjects to work asking them to describe what is going 
on inside of them regarding their happiness. Yet, one soon realizes that human capacities to communicate 
about their emotions of happiness and unhappiness are limited. Nor are 
they always aware how they arrive at their specific or general state of 
happiness or unhappiness. To describe in some detail beyond good and 
bad how we feel generally or about a certain occurrence, we may deem it 
necessary to resort to flowery language. But words are poor transmitters 
of emotions, and so we must hope that others can and will reconstruct the 
emotional qualities we try to describe with rational words. The metaphors 
and nuances of such emotional translations appear to be more at home in 
the province of art. Happiness seems similarly difficult to categorize and 
quantify as love, which does not appear to be a coincidence because these 
emotions are closely intertwined. Immediate subjectivity permeates them 
and anything we can say about them. It seems therefore difficult to base 
scientific insights, which must by their nature be characterized by rational 
assessments and comprehension, not compassion, on their expressions.  
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Empirical science then deems it necessary to retreat to communications 
about happiness that reflect a rational approach. The closest happiness science 
could get to communications of happiness in rational terms has been an intensity 
scale that ranges from very happy to very unhappy in conversational increments. 
Subjects are asked to qualify their impressions as happiness or unhappiness and 
quantify their strength. While this sounds simple enough, how does one assess 
what people mean when they say they are happy or unhappy or express any state 
in between or at the extreme ends of this scale? How does one assess whether 
subjects are honest with themselves or with the person asking? How does what 
subjects say and feel in terms of happiness and unhappiness compare to what 
other people say and feel? The characterizations that happiness science is using 
are very imprecise descriptions to reflect what people are feeling and there is little 
telling if they communicate or even can communicate what they are feeling. And 
these characterizations are all the more imprecise since we do not know about 
possible differences among individuals in the range or relative weight in scales.  
Problems with the verbal expression of happiness go beyond 
imprecisions in expressing points on a scale or the comparability of 
scales. Before we even get to these difficulties, we must define what 
happiness is because different ways of defining happiness are bound 
to yield different answers to the above stated questions. Since both 
researchers and their subjects use this term in happiness studies, one 
should describe happiness according to the scientific definition and 
compare this definition to what happiness means to the subjects of 
a scientific study who communicate about it. Obviously, insights are 
best obtained if the definitions match. Situations where they do not 
match introduce additional complexities that science must handle in 
its quest for useful statements and conclusions about happiness. 
So how should one define happiness for purposes of scientific qualification and quantification? 
Happiness feels different for each need and thus each combination of needs. If this were not the case, 
fulfillment of one need would satisfy other needs. People feel a variety of states and types of happiness 
or unhappiness contemporaneously according to the satisfaction status of each 
of their needs. But how different are these sensations of happiness and in what 
way can they contribute to an overall sensation of happiness? Although there are 
different types of happiness, their states seem to have an effect on one another. 
To what extent is it possible for individuals to sense different kinds and express 
the states of happiness? Can subjects sufficiently distinguish among them? How 
do types and levels of happiness interact? Can subjects be aware of and express 
this interaction or its components adequately in context or isolation? Or should 
we look at happiness as a composite? Should a definition recognize a hierarchy 
among different kinds of happiness in correspondence with a hierarchy of needs? 
Should needs be categorized according to whether they are capable of producing 
unique or interchangeable happiness? Do assessments of happiness allow for 
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particularizations of needs in wishes? Defining happiness as the 
securing of basic needs in a generic fashion will yield different 
results than defining it as a more elevated or individual matter. 
Covering basic needs that allow people to do what they really 
want might be seen as only a starting point for happiness, a 
milestone, or the ultimate destination. Should happiness be 
distinguished according to whether it describes different stages 
of happiness reflecting its pursuit, gratification, and memory? 
How do we account for diverse and sometimes contradictory 
phenomena in the accrual, presence, and fading of happiness 
relative to inducing events? Individuals can be happy looking 
forward to prospects that may not materialize. They may also 
be happy with pursuits without knowing or reaching a result. 
They may be happy with their aspirations even if they have not 
started pursuing them or experience setbacks. They may not be 
happy with reaching a goal because it is not what they imagined 
or because they might already have set their sights further on 
new objectives. They may look back in nostalgic happiness and it may not 
correctly recall their former happiness or its causes. Once people reach 
their objectives, they may be unhappy with nothing much else left to do. 
They may be unhappy if everything they desire is just handed to them. 
So happiness changes in the anticipation, course, and accomplishment of 
pursuit. At what point in this development do we measure happiness? Is 
the absence of happiness or unhappiness their respective opposite or 
should it be a neutral state? Do definitions depend on the factors defining 
each individual? Should resulting differences be taken into consideration 
or ignored? Can a common definition excluding people’s peculiarities be 
found? Do definitions evolve as experiences develop and should such an 
evolution be taken into 
account or discounted? 
Do subjects even have a 
firm idea of their happiness and should they be allowed 
or even encouraged to consider their definition? Should 
they instead be asked to relate unreflected, immediate 
impressions? How do we account for differences among 
individuals in their reflections about happiness? 
All these definitional questions cause problems 
for the scientific study of happiness. This untidiness may 
lead scientists to reserve the definition of happiness for 
themselves. How much confidence can they have in their 
scientific abilities if they admit not having a firm grasp on 
what happiness is. But scientists involved in happiness 
studies often cannot agree on a definition of happiness. 
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In many instances, they try to support philosophical theories they follow 
by empirical evidence. Such efforts may be regarded beneficial because 
so often philosophies of happiness are deficient on empirical reflections 
of their theories. However, the hoped-for empirical founding or firming 
up of philosophies rarely materializes. Even their invalidation may not 
be pursued or obtained. Too often, researchers follow the prejudices of 
philosophical schools of thought to a fault. They tend to focus on partial 
aspects of happiness that they postulate to be the entirety, leading to a 
byzantine mess of differentiations and debates. Though they may make 
valid points, their partiality would have to be balanced and they would 
need to be joined and reconciled to correctly reflect the phenomenon 
of happiness. As it is, research methods and results of happiness science 
are tainted by incomplete horizons. Going down different rabbit holes, their outlooks and outcomes are 
difficult to reconcile. Maybe defining happiness could be an objective 
of research and not necessitate definition at the beginning? But then 
how does one know what subjects and researchers are talking about 
when they discuss happiness and unhappiness? And how does one 
make sure they have the same ideas about what happiness is? Maybe 
it would help to share a definition of happiness with subjects and ask 
them about their happiness as defined in the question? However, that 
may not match subjects’ understanding. Questions may then not elicit 
responses following the definition implied or expressed in the asked 
questions. Should subjects be permitted to state their own definitions 
of happiness as they perceive happiness or should they be permitted 
to choose from a menu of definitions? If these definitions are not the 
same, can subjects accept, and respond according to, a definition that 
differs from theirs? Does it even make sense to ask that they adjust 
their definitions of happiness to those given to them? Should multiple 
definitions be permitted to coexist and grouped together? What would it mean to exclude incongruencies 
from a scientific survey of happiness? Should science just take 
in the encountered range of subjects’ definitions and attempt 
to sort out their variety after collecting responses? And how 
can scientists ascertain valid reconciliation processes? These 
are some of the questions this type of research would have to 
answer to claim validity but generally fails to do so. 
One could try to circumvent these issues by finding 
and measuring a physical response that regularly occurs when 
people say they feel happy or feel any other level on the scale. 
Such an indicator may be a precursor, a participant, or effect 
of happiness. For any of these, it would be difficult to equate 
its presence with the emotion of happiness itself, its type, or 
its intensity. Assuming correlations to physiological indicators 
can be established, can we conclude anything from them but 
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that the totality of circumstances bearing on happiness has coalesced to 
result in certain levels of an indicator. Arguably, the happiness caused by 
an occurrence can be measured by physiological deviations caused by its 
introduction, and different physiological indicators are identifiable for a 
number of different needs. However, the effect of such an occurrence 
cannot be measured without its correlation with all other factors in a 
person’s life bearing on their happiness at that time. It is therefore bound 
to fluctuate with the person’s situation and disposition. These personal 
details can work as reinforcements or as depressants on happiness and 
its physiological expressions. Also, identifying physiological indicators for 
happiness does not necessarily assist us in defining happiness. Rather, the 
opposite is likely to occur. We can only accept a physiological indicator as 
reliable if it indicates incidents we already otherwise identified to induce 
happiness and if it matches their communicated scale. And assuming one 
succeeds correlating physiological markers with what people say about their 
happiness, how can we confirm that they correctly quantify happiness? We 
may display a certain percentage more or less of a substance that has been 
found to increase or decrease with happiness. But how can we prove a direct 
relation of a physiological measure to happiness? Can we feel quantifications 
in sufficient detail? And can we match this detail to the rough quantifications 
by which people communicate their levels of happiness? These questions 
make it appear that physiological indicators of happiness are subject to similar 
criticisms of imprecision and possible error as their verbal counterparts.  
But physiological indicators carry an additional risk because they may 
give rise to the idea that their manipulation or artificial induction can produce 
happiness. Mistaking happiness as merely a good feeling, such an approach 
short-circuits the joint purpose of happiness in correlation with unhappiness 
to motivate and steer us in securing our existence and thriving. Preventing our exercise of these essential 
functions by simulating them or their results constitutes an ultimate betrayal that places us in danger of 
unhappiness and death. Shortcutting us to a mere feeling of happiness helps 
us as much to achieve happiness as any other mind-altering drugs. They are 
matched or exceeded by extreme unhappiness when we wake up from the 
fake euphoric dreamworld they temporarily instill and discover that nothing 
we experienced was real and that we have wasted precious time to secure a 
basis for actual happiness. But rather than rue our betrayal, the harsh contrast 
of our reality may make us yearn to go back under the influence of happiness-
inducing drugs. They are then opposites of medications that fight imbalances 
preventing people from the production of happiness-inducing events.  
For lack of notable answers about causes or influences of happiness, 
happiness science concentrates on phenomena not triggered or affected to 
an expected extent. It points out as a major revelation that many of us spring 
back to their normal levels of happiness after events cause variances. Or that 
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a variety of people do not let a variety of events affect their happiness much 
in the first place. They conclude that some individuals are more susceptible 
in their happiness to life’s ups or downs. They pronounce that dispositions 
run by inheritance or influence in families. They report that people’s outlook 
on, or experience of, happiness can be predisposed by settings and by prior 
experiences. As if we did not already know this. Research telling us that our 
observations in these respects are accurate does not help us. And generally 
quantifying and qualifying these phenomena of susceptibility, bounce-back, 
resilience, and normalcy does not matter much for our individual happiness. 
They result largely from deeply rooted personal factors that are complicated 
or impossible to adjust, and happiness studies offer very little in this respect.  
On an even higher level of generalization, copious attention has been 
given to comparing the relative happiness of countries and cultures and to the 
issuing of rankings in a few selected categories of happiness as well as overall 
happiness. However, the dullness of qualifying and quantifying happiness and 
following its causes only permits vague comparisons. Results are of even less 
utility than those derived within a country or culture. This is so because these 
competitions of who is happier and who is the happiest compare expressions 
and concepts of happiness from a range of different cultures and languages, 
and bunch together individuals with at times very different settings within the 
areas they compare. Without a precise understanding of resulting differences 
and making corrections for them, such studies compress massively different 
circumstances into biased and misleading denominators and judgments. 
All these issues encountered by empiric research of happiness limit anything one can tell based 
on broad scientific studies about the causes of happiness. They limit happiness studies to correlations that 
are so pronounced that they become clear despite these problems. Being limited to general observations 
and deductions that are shared prominently by humans through their accumulated everyday experiences, 
this kind of science must as of yet omit individual parameters of happiness and their complex interactions. 
Its outlook and methods must focus on measuring the general modalities 
of basic needs satisfaction and dissatisfaction with an only limited review 
of articulations of such needs into wishes and manners of pursuit. What it 
reveals then are common denominators for basic happiness and general 
statements about what makes some, more, most, or all people happy or 
sad combined with statements about distributions over ranges indicating 
the intensity of happiness or unhappiness. This gives rise to a question how 
superior such insights are over the commonsense insights they trace.  
Arguably, happiness science offers a significant advantage beyond 
commonplaces in being able to quantify happiness as a matter of scientific 
insight. It can determine what types of causes make what percentages of 
what types of people happy to a roughly expressed level of happiness. In 
other words, one might be able to say that individuals of a certain profile 
have a better or a lower chance of generating generalized types or levels 
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of happiness from certain types of objectives or pursuits. This may be an insight 
whose exact quantification we did not know. But such an increased accuracy on 
something of which we had a rougher idea based on our experiences does not 
help anybody with their happiness. For one, it does not benefit someone who 
does not fall within the indicated research categories. And even for persons who 
qualify under researched categories, the insight from happiness research is not 
worth much. That there is a certain percentage of people similar to me in certain 
respects can be useful or disturbing. But it does not help me in my interactions 
with other people because I will have to gauge, and react to, each of them on 
their own terms. Nor does it help me to improve my happiness because chances 
are that I might not fall within the percentages of the researched categories that 
have experienced a described effect. And because effects and their indicators 
are vague, I may have difficulties relating them to me. I also may have distinguishing other characteristics 
or circumstances that lead to a different ultimate result for me. Giving me exact polling on what others 
find more or less happiness inducing or unhappiness inducing and what they do to what percentages is 
unhelpful since I do not know how their dispositions and circumstances 
differ from mine. I might use scientific insights of what makes others in 
similar classes happy to see what it does for me. But this is information 
I can collect simply by being attentive to me and my surroundings, and 
with much better acumen because I can compare detailed personalities 
and situations. And such information is useless to me if I have tried or 
considered acting according to it and already rejected the proposition.  
The only benefit of such research I can perceive is informing 
someone to use such information in dealings with multitudes of others. 
Much of happiness science seems therefore like polling by a different 
name. Individuals and associations whose success depends on certain 
quantities or qualities of people acting, or viewing things, a certain way 
may use data and conclusions of happiness studies. They may use them 
to target identifiable individuals, or individuals as unidentified members of statistical groups. One might 
think this is not objectionable because it stands to give people what they want. But such information is as 
easily accessed to make people unhappy or to exploit their unhappiness, and 
even their happiness, or potentials, for manipulative purposes. Even without 
a lot of sophistication, happiness research can be converted for propaganda 
purposes to manipulate individuals, groups, and societies into certain views 
and behaviors. For instance, it can be misused to tell people that they live in 
circumstances inducing more happiness than they actually experience. This 
may sound like a ridiculous proposition, but can be a powerful instrument of 
control. If people get the notion that others around them are happy, they may 
relate their relative unhappiness to personal failings or simply bad luck. They 
may relent on attributing fault to more systemic failings and therefore not 
feel systemic change is necessary to raise their happiness. This potential may 
tempt regimes of any persuasion to employ happiness science to assist them. 
It may be used not only to hone their targeting for subsequent manipulation 
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but also in the manipulation. This could be accomplished by outright lying 
to the populace about research results. In more open societies in which such 
schemes might come to light, happiness research itself may be manipulated 
to suggest nonexistent correlations or suggest correlations that do not exist 
in presented quantifications. The many technical and substantive problems 
burdening happiness research offer many opportunities for such mischief.  
A simple method to manipulate 
research and obtain inaccurate answers 
is to use variances in how subjects define 
their happiness or pinpoint it on a scale, 
giving preference to persons who would 
be more favorable to the government. 
Or authorities might attempt to suggest 
definitions beneficial to them and only 
query about circumstances relevant pursuant to such definitions. This, 
like any other manipulation, would of course be particularly effective 
if subjects did not have their own firmly considered ideas. Apart from 
utilizing definitions of happiness, governments may posit questions in 
ways and on topics that tend to elicit favorable responses. They may 
over-proportionally question persons or types of persons who respond 
positively. They may place polled individuals in an apprehension that 
negative responses might have negative consequences for them. They may invoke national or tribal pride. 
Or, regardless of the conditions of happiness in a society, ruling elites may engage happiness polling as an 
instrument to show that government reacts to the needs and wishes of the populace. While there may be 
constructive aspects to this, the institution of such measures begs the question how government could 
be at such a distance from the populace to make this polling necessary. Does it not prove that government 
currently is not a fair or effective representation of the populace and its preferences? And could polling 
not be employed as a false or superficial sign that the populace is being heard? And could polling not be 
manipulated to skew or override elections, particularly when its immediacy favors a particular outcome? 
These dangers of polling in government affairs are increasingly more evident as it is increasingly employed. 
Such manipulative applications of happiness science may not only be 
exercised by already established governments. They may also be used in the 
reverse direction by oppositions aiming to govern or see a government more 
to their liking installed. But then again, polling has legitimate purposes simply 
for informational purposes to help find direction in it, and without an attached 
agenda other than to better represent or serve a populace, even if this benefits 
the inquirer as well. It may be applied to gear well-meaning programs to their 
requirements or best effects. This makes it difficult to distinguish manipulative 
uses of polling. Still, even if polling is not manipulated, what does it mean that 
certain proportions of types of people hold certain types of views. Does it mean 
minorities are recognized and protected? Should majorities dictate policy, and 
if so to what extent? Should minorities’ happiness not count or not as much? 
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Should one try to convert minority views to align with majorities? 
These questions present themselves in every election. But polling 
allows to answer such questions more often and in greater detail 
and to adjust behavior accordingly. Not only governing behavior 
but also the behavior of the polled populace. The wish to create 
clear answers and directions and maximum benefit may exceed 
its target by focusing on bringing deviations into line. Thinking 
through possible consequences of happiness studies then seems 
vital if they are not to cause unhappiness. Polling for utilitarian or 
manipulative purposes has on some level occurred for some time, 
even with scientific involvement. Still, happiness studies grant a 
semblance of benevolent legitimacy and trustworthiness to such 
practices. A growing number of governments and organizations 
have taken up this mantle and are dressing themselves in it.  
Considering the dearth of sophistication displayed by happiness 
studies, one might with good reason argue that they have not advanced 
to a point where sinister, misguided, or thoughtless forces could inflict 
serious damage in their use or abuse. And reviews of polls, reports, and 
rankings appear to confirm such an impression. But there is a much more 
imminent and much more dangerous aspect to happiness science. A full 
grasp of this danger took some time to develop in my mind because the 
threat involves recent developments in science and technology. As I was 
reading happiness studies, the question kept presenting itself whether 
they are not marketing studies with a slightly different angle and narrow 
scope. At first glance, marketing studies seem to differ from happiness 
studies because marketing studies are primarily interested in the sale of 
products. Still, they operate with an 
understanding that selling requires 
a product to address a need or wish and is able to increase customers’ 
happiness, and that chances of success for a product rise the happier 
it makes its customers. Because happiness embodies the key to sales, 
marketing studies have already developed surprisingly sophisticated 
definitions of happiness for their purposes. And they have developed 
rather sophisticated manners how these types of happiness can be 
gauged and addressed. Admittedly, marketing studies are interested 
only in some types of happiness that are most related to sales. But 
their approaches can be, and have been, adapted to other aspects of 
happiness, not least because extraneous concepts of happiness can 
be employed to market a product. And with marketing studies being 
undertaken to cover products for about any conceivable concern, the 
amalgamation of these studies alone stands to tell us more in more 
detail about human happiness than happiness studies at their current 
or foreseeable states. This is also because marketing firms will not be 
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retained or rewarded unless they succeed identifying potential customers’ 
needs and wishes and unless they find and present to customers who might 
be or become interested in a product enough to make a sale. Maximizing 
the effectiveness and efficiency of such marketing efforts sets much more 
ambitious goals than happiness studies do and could reasonably entertain. 
Marketing has its sights set on a maximum of transparency of the populace 
for sales purposes. Picture what one could tell about a person if everybody 
participated in marketing studies for every product and if this information 
were widely available. An uncomfortable prospect. And yet this is where 
things are headed and they are on their way far beyond this exposure level 
because the data density, width, and depth collected about individuals by 
far exceeds sales-related concerns. As the 
scope and history of empirical data points 
on individuals grows, they permit a mosaic 
that is gradually forming ever more exact representations of the analyzed 
person. This abundance of information at an individual level can be used, 
and in parts is already being used, to gain and exert power over individuals 
in any imaginable aspect of their life. And the precision and sophistication 
of machines in discerning and connecting data points to create individual 
profiles will only grow as modeling and processing powers advance.  
Because happiness is the overarching, principal human concern, 
understanding it in all its facets forms the holy grail of such undertakings. 
Happiness studies then are of particular interest in the pursuit of power 
over individuals. That academic happiness studies are relatively immature 
and naive in their current state poses an opportunity to instrumentalize them. Due to their relatedness to 
marketing studies, happiness studies stand to advance from gleaning marketing studies’ approaches, data, 
and insights. So, happiness studies may be keen to cooperate with marketing studies, offering happiness 
insights in return. This return may presently not be much. But after bringing happiness studies up to speed 
with more sophisticated market research, such studies and their access to subjects may become of more 
use. And even absent such a Faustian bargain, happiness 
studies could not ignore the information collected and 
techniques pioneered by marketing studies. If happiness 
science won’t incorporate these advances, it is likely to 
emulate them. And the results of its scientific treatment 
of them are likely to be freely available under the maxim 
of scientific advancement. Thus, any worthwhile insights 
happiness studies derive are likely to find application in 
marketing efforts. That happiness lack in perspective and 
have not succeeded more turns then out to be a blessing. 
Their abuse potential in case they advance seems reason 
enough not to drive them past their present state. In any 
event, the progressive insertion of marketing studies and 
their results into concerns of happiness seems firmly set, 
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with or without the participation of happiness 
studies. It seems only a matter of time before 
detailed individual happiness profiles are widely 
and regularly available. And it also appears to be 
only a matter of time before they are widely and 
regularly used for marketing and manipulation. 
The time until this becomes our reality is rapidly 
getting shorter and might already have passed. 
Having just started recently with a benevolent 
intent to advance humanity, maybe happiness 
science could be impressed to speak up against 
these threatened transparency and abuses. It is, 
as particularization of its constituent sciences, 
the only independent science anchored enough 
in concerns of human happiness to assess the threat of these abuses and 
speak with authority against them. This would require happiness science 
to reverse its direction. It would have to argue that happiness, even if it 
can be known on an individual level by third parties, must be reserved to 
each individual. It would have to further insist that such information could 
only be released, maintained, or used in allotments and to recipients of 
each person’s determination and only for agreed purposes and durations. 
Maybe such a radical change in the direction of happiness studies is too 
much to hope for, especially since this movement has not already taken 
hold. Maybe popular movements for personal information protection will 
have to carry the burden alone or in conjunction with enlightened data 
processing experts. Either way, happiness studies seem to be holding the 
potential of enabling or preventing nightmarish individual transparency, 
exploitation, and decline of freedom. If they continue failing to take their 
responsibility seriously, which they assumed when they claimed charge of 
the science of happiness, they will be responsible for the resulting misery.  
8. Independent Approaches Toward a Philosophy of Happiness. 
So where does a review of self-help, religious, philosophical, and further 
scientific approaches toward human happiness leave us in our search 
for guidance? On one hand I think we have reason to be encouraged by 
an emerging awareness and respect for fundamental human needs and 
the conditions for their pursuit. One the other, I have been disheartened 
by the lack of universal recognition and support for resulting existential 
human rights. Many authorities deliver lip service to human rights, but 
they do not expend much effort establishing them and their modalities. 
The interactions, practicalities, and obstacles of existential human rights 
are not being sufficiently addressed by such authorities. As apparently 
minor application details, they are being left to societal, governmental, 
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and international organizations, some of which were started by these authorities. 
These organizations declare basic human rights in commandments, charters, and 
constitutions. Yet, the application of these general declarations is habitually frayed, 
twisted, restricted, or ignored, by political, cultural, or personal influences. Since 
these rights express fundamentals defined by existential needs, they are accessible 
to universal insight by any human. They are also open to the direct insight that, as 
bare existential basics, they should apply absolute. Applications could benefit from 
unequivocal statements, explanations, and positions by authorities to this effect. 
Authoritative perseverance of what these principles are and how they should be 
applied would go a long way. Then again, lack of insight is not the problem in the 
application context. People are aware when they violate other humans’ existential 
rights simply by the sense that they would not want to suffer the infractions they 
commit. The problem is rather that authorities 
have resigned the application of human rights 
to groups and organizations many of which are 
the primary candidates to subvert or prevent 
applications when it fits them. Some efforts have been made to move 
judgment and enforcement of human rights away from such bodies. 
But these measures do not have real teeth because they only exist at 
the permission of the very organizations they are to govern.  
Hoping for a supra-national organization with full capabilities 
to assess, adjudicate, and counteract violations of existential human 
rights is unrealistic. However, the establishment of a super-authority 
would also be problematic because it could be hijacked by nefarious 
interests or give rise to tribal conflict. Instead, the universal character 
of basic human rights and the common access to understanding them 
suggests decentralization of administrative functions to each of us individually and together. If everybody 
who suffers a human rights violation speaks and acts up and everybody who witnesses or hears of such a 
violation does so as well, existential human rights will become a universal reality. Short of that, it is hard 
to say whether and how much humanity is advancing, and how much it can 
advance, toward universal conceptualization, affirmation, and enforcement 
of existential human rights. I believe this outlook on required remedies is as 
fundamental as the rights they are to protect. That ethical authorities have 
not mounted a determined, united effort to provide theoretical and practical 
guidance in making basic human rights the universal reality they proclaim to 
be due speaks for itself. Although they should muster the necessary insight 
and make maximum use of their influences, they mostly stand by idly or only 
as commentators as individuals the world over battle on their own to secure 
the fundamentals for their happiness. This renunciation of responsibility by 
authorities has a long tradition that is only sporadically interrupted by rogue 
elements among them. History in not in any shape to deal out merit badges 
to any ethical authorities for advancing basic human rights. The incomplete, 
half-hearted recognition and recitation by such authorities is inacceptable. 
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Another great disappointment in my review of self-help, religious, 
philosophical, and other scientific approaches toward human happiness is 
the lack of help for individuals to find their way beyond these fundamentals. 
Contrary to widespread claims and attributions of authority and substance, 
there is very little for us to work with at our individual level. No doubt, there 
are a number of good bits of advice or interesting objectives or methods 
that we might or even should try to see how they suit and benefit us. Some 
of the suggestions I surveyed might give us a temporary boost or assist us 
more sustainably. But in the end, these were relatively small answers to the 
much bigger problem of human happiness. I could not locate anything that 
would promote us as individuals to advance above the insecurity, error, and 
resulting dissatisfaction that a lack of orientation, preparation, and planning 
brings. Worse than this, I found that our search for human happiness in self-
help, religious, philosophical, and other scientific approaches to happiness carries great potential to lead 
us astray and damage our happiness, down to existential levels. In terms of Hans Christian Andersen’s 
“The Emperor’s New Clothes,” all the emperor wears for his big parade is underpants. And he might be a 
charlatan, oppressive fraud, and an instigator or 
purveyor of pain and disaster. In other words, we 
have shamefully little to revere but much to fear 
about those who tell us how to live our life. 
If you think of dismissing what I say, first 
think of the probability of my conclusion from a 
commonsense viewpoint. If someone asked us to 
submit our concerns to the direction of strangers 
and trust that they can and will look out for our 
interests before theirs, most of us would pause. 
We would have sufficient common sense to view 
this proposition with greatest caution. We would 
inquire about their motives. We would not allow 
ourselves to be blindsided by the fact that these 
unfamiliar persons 
can point to credentials and authority. If anything, bragging with who they 
are, rather than proving to us the truth of what they say, should raise our 
defenses even more because it makes them more suspect in their intentions 
and capable to deceive or abuse us. We would not permit them to lead us 
without having reviewed their track record. And we would not let ourselves 
be swayed by the fact that many others obey them. We would not let others 
talk us into something that does not pass muster under our BS meter or that 
violates common sense. These are principles of a sound judgment most of 
us have learned during childhood and that we apply in everyday encounters. 
Why are we throwing this better sense to the wind when it comes to the 
direction of our life? Why would we ignore that creators and promoters of 
systems and fragmented ideas are commanded by their individual interests 
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like everybody else? Why would we not ask what is in it for 
them if we follow? Why would we not see they could not tell 
what we want or how we want to pursue it if they wanted to?  
Obvious exceptions to these issues are sources merely 
stating commonsense principles of human happiness. We may 
seek out and peruse such sources to lay open and develop our 
understanding of common basics of happiness shared by all 
humans. We should run them through our mind with judicious 
caution, but we have the capacity of analyzing and dismissing 
or confirming them with common sense. As part of our review, 
we need to remain guarded that the sources we accept in fact 
limit their scope to common principles. An honest assessment 
of general aspects of happiness would necessarily be limited 
to principles humans can recognize as common. It cannot give 
individualized guidance beyond common principles because nothing else can in 
honesty be claimed to apply with commonsensical universality. Only erroneous, 
thoughtless, or fraudulent statements transgress this boundary. Unfortunately, 
such deviations abound, and we need to remain vigilant against them posturing 
as general principles. Establishing a firm understanding of the common basics of 
human happiness is indispensable because of their existential importance and 
because they are the foundations for launching 
individual pursuits. In spite of achievements in 
this regard, the frequently incomplete level and 
the persistent violations of fundamental rights 
prove that we must as of yet still be reminded 
of them to establish and preserve this common 
foundational happiness for every human. Sadly, 
societies have in alarmingly many instances not 
advanced to recognize all such foundations, or not to their full scope. And 
there is continuing and recurring justification not to take foundations for 
granted even if they are present at the time. In many instances, people 
might not generate or internalize and practice these basic principles on 
their own, or at least not consistently. So far, it seems necessary to cast 
these basics into rules supported by authority they recognize and even 
fear. Commonsense principles of happiness must be enforced by codes 
or laws to make people comply or at least not damage others with their 
non-compliance. But these codifications only mark outer limits imposed 
by mostly prohibitive laws. They cannot fill the basic principles of human 
happiness with the positive substance they require to benefit us by our 
doing or by reciprocity and mutual care. It is difficult to get people to act 
on principles that find their source in love, compassion, solidarity, and 
decency if they do not exhibit these qualities on their own. Maybe people 
can be convinced to display these qualities if they are hidden or inhibited 
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in them. Maybe the types of commonsense sources of human happiness we 
reviewed in self-help, religious, philosophical, and empiric science contexts 
can play a role in this. To various degrees, this has been their function all 
along. But the motivation for engaging them must come from inside of us. 
However deficient humans have been in accepting common sources 
and principles of happiness, we can place hope in the recent trend of codifying 
and practicing human rights and obligations on the basis of a common nature 
as humans. We can take faith in in the growing societal support for protection 
of, and active assistance for, the fulfillment of basic human needs. The more 
fortunate of us live in legal orders where such rights and societal care is more 
or less recognized, although there may be remaining questions to be resolved. 
Having this footing for our setting of objectives and pursuits is more precious 
than we might realize if we have never had to 
fight for these basics. We have reason to be very happy about this growing 
achievement of humanity we get to enjoy. However, having these basics 
secured, we also realize that this is not the entirety of our happiness. We 
can have all our fundamental needs satisfied and still yearn for happiness. 
We can still search aimlessly not even knowing why we are restless. In fact, 
we may blame the fulfillment of our basic needs as a reason for our lack of 
fulfillment. On first blush that does not seem to make sense. When we are 
deprived of basic necessities, we tend to believe we could be happy once 
they are fulfilled. But we cannot be happy for long in a system that fulfills 
basic needs only generically without individualization. Without impressing 
our customized objectives and ways on the fulfillment of basic needs, their 
securing seems to lose much value for us. We do not just want to exist but 
want to form our existence. This is also why we cannot be happy in a system 
that claims existential basics of human existence to be all there is to our 
happiness and that individualized paths beyond a general organization are superfluous or illegitimate. 
Imagining how it would be having to live in such a system demonstrates to us how important our individual 
articulations of happiness are and how important it is that we are involved in bringing them into reality. 
And yet most systems do not give us much of a clue about how to 
find our individual articulations of happiness. That may be understandable 
because idiosyncrasies in our setting of objectives and their pursuit might 
detract from the principles of systems. Most work best when their parts or 
members fit into predictable molds and act in predictable ways, which may 
therefore be the primary concern of systems. Individual articulations may 
be an irritant for most. This is how we can distinguish whether a system is 
geared toward assisting us or assisting somebody else who benefits from 
its order. But maybe a system knows its fair instrumental place. Maybe it 
only addresses the fundamentals of human needs in as far as they can be 
reasonably covered in a systematic way, leaving individual articulations of 
basics and wishes beyond to its inhabitants. This freedom may be unnerving 
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or frightening for many of us, especially if we originate from a setting where 
individuality was systematically suppressed, limited, or guided. Nevertheless, 
the opportunity to build our individual happiness is connected to the presence 
of this free space, this void, with all its uncertainties and insecurities.  
Filling this void with independently derived strategies that maximize 
our happiness may be a new proposition for most of us. This is why we might 
look for assistance. Constructing our individual happiness does not mean that 
we could or should not avail ourselves of assistance, as long as we reserve a 
considered discretion about its utility and use. We just have to be careful that 
we do not fall again into a mode where we allow others to tell us what makes 
us happy and how we should pursue happiness. That there is very little non-
overbearing assistance on finding our individual path toward happiness may 
sound surprising. It might come as a shock to people who like I have held out hope that the important 
answers to our happiness already have been arrived at and confirmed. 
My surprise dates back decades to the start of my studying philosophy 
and decades of experiences confirming that initial surprise.  
It must be so much more difficult for someone who until more 
recently has been accustomed to trust, respect, or at least condone the 
system in which they live. It has to be difficult to institute the necessary 
judgment distance if one has grown up in, or has long been surrounded 
by, an established system that defines one’s normal. And it may be even 
more difficult to find such distance when people have been attracted to 
such a system or found protection in it when their happiness was under 
threat. They might stay defensive of their familiar system in prejudiced 
gratitude and might fear the task of building a system of their own into 
a relative unknown. They might survey worse specimens of conceptual 
rabbit holes and come to the conclusion that theirs is not that bad in comparison. They may be swayed 
by the propaganda of a system. People may be particularly set in their ways if the system in which they 
live is merely interested in regulating a relatively small portion of their 
pursuits. Or its regulation may be so indirect that its presence may not 
be perceived at all or not as prohibitive obstacle. The limited nature 
of impositions, indirectness, or public relations of a system governing 
our ideas of happiness may cause hesitation appreciating its using us, 
its patronizing us, or its holding us back. We may not fathom that we 
are being kept and may behave similar to children in an authoritative 
household. We may not realize that we are taught and mostly accept 
how to conduct ourselves, what to think, and what to believe. We may 
be comfortable with this as a continuation of childhood conditioning, 
which in all likelihood already prepared us to get along in and with the 
system. Throughout history and modern times, humans have regularly 
agreed, or at least acquiesced, with paternalistic governance. But ask 
yourself: How has following recognized authorities worked out?  
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Why do so many look for answers in mostly foolish self-help books, 
why do scores turn on religious teachings, why do they think philosophy is 
a dead elitist pastime with no practical value, why do they grasp at straws 
of happiness studies? Why, unless these traditional sources for happiness 
instruction have failed them? Beyond that, do you see any followers of any 
recognized authority being significantly happier? Even if they should say 
so, their accounts are likely compromised. A lot of people stuck in a system 
ordering and prescribing their ways may know better. But they might be 
afraid of internal or external repercussions if they state or act otherwise. 
They might want to perpetuate or complete their delusion that someone 
else’s ideas about happiness apply to them. And, as people walk down a 
misguided path long enough, they may be in too deep with their minds and 
life circumstances. They might not be able or dare to imagine concepts and 
paths of their own or admit that they have missed major opportunities of 
self-determination along the way, major opportunities of a happy life. 
Admitting to themselves or to others whose opinion they respect that 
they took a wrong turn or never tried to take their own direction may 
be too painful. They may faithfully or desperately continue following 
tracks that someone else laid out for them. They may even deny this 
is occurring. So not everybody may be able or possess the courage to 
admit there is something wrong with how their life has proceeded so 
far, that something important is missing or could be improved. And 
maybe there isn’t. Maybe they are already happy enough. 
Maybe the system in which they find themselves embedded 
happens to match their values or has succeeded in aligning their mind. 
Maybe they have been savvy or fortunate enough to carve out their 
happiness exactly the way they see fit. Maybe they regard what they 
were able to accomplish in a system good enough to not risk it. They 
may have managed to reduce their world to a shell in which they have 
succeeded to secure a measure of happiness. Maybe their happiness is 
reliant on maintaining structures and processes that take advantage of 
others in the system. Maybe they benefit from the resident type of the 
mental-industrial complex that has smothered, deceived, and stunted 
humanity in most civilized reaches of the earth. Such people may not be 
interested in acknowledging the emperor wears no clothes or what his 
qualities are for various reasons. They may rely on or be a constituent of 
the empire. Change may jeopardize their way of making a living. They 
may not see a choice or deem their contributions objectionable.  
Then there are those with a closed mind who absolutely believe 
in the system and follow it without knowing better and without doubt. 
They short-circuit any criticism of rules the system has instructed them 
to live by to automatic rejection. Such fanatics may also pose problems 
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for the emancipation of others. They may be willing enforcers for a system 
they deem to be the foundation of their happiness and, true to its character 
as a system, the happiness of everybody else in its reach. They may see any 
disagreement with the system as attack on its working for them. Unless they 
encounter a systematic crisis that unbalances them, no amount of talk may 
be able to reach them and free them of a restrictive system because their 
mindset prevents them from listening and fairly considering what they hear. 
But then there are those who are not in such complicit or tethered 
positions or are not too far invested to see that a new perspective, a new 
approach toward happiness may be in order. I am talking to those who have 
not shut themselves off and who maintain misgivings about taking someone 
else’s word on how to live their life. I identify with all of them because I have 
been in a similar situation. After all, I spent many years trying in vain to prove 
the emperor wore a full attire of magnificent clothes and was parading as an 
admired, benevolent leader. At least I was hoping I could find or maybe piece 
together a philosophy of happiness that could be universally shared among 
humanity for a better world. Nobody could have been more astonished than 
I to see this possibility slip successively away with every try. Not finding any 
satisfying answers, I eventually gave up asking probing questions and decided 
to look for guidance at people around me and how they coped. I resigned that 
my happiness would have to thrive within the framework of a solid job and 
my income, marriage, friendships, hobbies and other diversions, and would 
otherwise expand by trial and error, some good advice, some foresight, and 
the determination of doing my best. I created a little world for myself in which 
I could live a sheltered, reasonably happy existence and not worry too much 
about what else was happening in the world outside. This did work out to a 
rather satisfying extent and to where it would have seemed ungrateful to be 
unhappy. But my mind, my conscience kept working on me, asking me unsettling questions such as: Did 
the reduction to this world built around me and the people I loved make me as happy as I should be? 
Looking forward, would other concerns eventually catch up? Looking 
back, was the time, effort, and faith of finding or creating a philosophy 
that would satisfy me wasted and better forgotten? Whenever one of 
these questions crept up, I regularly responded with a reminder of my 
blessings and increased resolve to appreciate them, even asking what 
more I could wish for? But that I was engaging in such a dialogue with 
myself showed that an increment of happiness was missing. I just did 
not see yet what was missing. And I was at a loss on how I or anybody 
could find their way to more happiness in such a nondescript situation. 
It took writing down this question, as I have a habit of doing, 
for me to figure out the response. Looking at it, the answer stared right 
back at me in the very words “I or anybody could find their way to more 
happiness in such a nondescript situation.” Maybe I or anybody could 
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indeed become empowered to find their own way to happiness. With other 
people’s recipes not being much help, it seemed clear we have to. But the 
question then was how to go about finding our way. Trying to figure this out 
gave me a new mission that put my studies and experiences to good use if 
only as examples of what to avoid. Looking back, starting this mission and 
pursuing it since was a big part of what had been missing in my happiness. I 
can also see now that the many years of frustrating research had a purpose. 
This was what it took to comprehend the low level at which human thought 
on happiness has been and what might be undertaken to raise it. They were 
necessary to scope out that we must take charge of our happiness because 
guidance by others falls woefully short. They showed me that nobody else 
does and can know as well as we in our own probing and insight what makes 
us happy. They were necessary for me to see that we must shake off what others try to make us believe, 
feel, think, or do, and that we must and can with confidence rely on our own capacities to figure out our 
happiness. They taught me that to succeed we need to grow up and learn to trust ourselves. 
Simply put, my mission is to encourage the opposite of taking 
somebody else’s word for what makes us happy. It is to assist people 
explore, develop, and implement their own concepts of happiness. Its 
guiding principle is that to be sure that our objectives and pursuits are 
genuinely ours, we each must find, grow, and mature our own insights 
regarding them. We each have to find and identify our own truth, our 
own understanding of circumstances, and our own path of happiness. 
In encouraging this leap and path of freedom, I am counting on those 
with an open mind that are willing to face a mirror of their happiness 
and look themselves deep in the eyes. Maybe the courage for facing 
happiness has to develop over time. And it certainly is a good idea not 
to rely on my or anyone else’s accounts what any self-help, religious, 
philosophical, and scientific approaches toward happiness have to 
offer. If you have not done so already, I encourage you to review for yourself writings and presentations 
on happiness. You may want to read and read about philosophies founded 
or said to be founded by the personalities whose portraits are interspersed 
throughout this article. Only, you might not want to take quite as long as I 
to arrive at a conclusion. To assist you in finding your way to and through 
relevant literature, I am listing key reading resources below in Chapter 9.  
Let us assume you come to the same conclusion as I that there is 
very little useful guidance on shaping one’s happiness. Once you decide to 
take charge of your happiness, how can I assist you? I can help you grasp 
the components and system of your happiness so that you can formulate 
strategies of pursuing it in an improved and optimized manner. You would 
begin this process by embarking on a mindful expedition through yourself 
and through your environment, visiting all parts to determine how they 
can contribute to or detract from your happiness. I can assist you in this by 
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suggesting an itinerary through shared aspects of human existence 
in your inner and outer world. I can encourage you to take notice of 
these shared aspects and your personal, particular impressions and 
expressions of them. I can advise you to permit yourself to take in 
unforeseen sights you encounter on your journey and to possibly go 
on detours or excursions that reflect additional particularities. I can 
point to possible implements that might be of use in your travels 
and stopovers. You might think of me as a travel advisor for your 
mind who describes worthwhile regions for a visit and manners of 
getting around. But this is not a guided tour. I am not going with you 
on your trip. And my assistance is not geared to your particularities. 
I do not know you and even if I did, I could not become involved so 
that the experiences on your journey are truly yours. You must take 
this journey yourself because only you can find your understanding 
of your happiness in the personal sites you visit, and only you know 
what these are, how to find them, and what to do there. Exploring 
your happiness is your inherent right and also your responsibility.  
Maybe this freedom paired with obligation is something to get used 
to. So many influences have been binding us to their tethers or we have tied 
ourselves to them without looking much elsewhere. But our happiness is an 
undertaking we cannot farm out to anybody else if we want to be happy. Nor 
can we agree to become livestock on somebody else’ farm. If we do not take 
our right and obligation to find and shape our happiness seriously, others will 
define our happiness for us. Or worse, they may deny it to us, push us aside, 
or use us in the pursuit of theirs. Even if that should not happen, insufficiently 
reflected pursuits and disorganized determinations are likely to damage our 
probabilities of success. Either way, we would likely find us at a disadvantage 
compared to those who have their objectives, and ways of working on them, 
figured out. We would be prone to not leading our life to its full potential. Or 
we would not even be leading our own life if we take somebody else’s 
word for what happiness is and how to pursue it. And we would run 
the risk that our lack of self-care could place us in circumstances that 
cause compounding unhappiness and further attenuate our hope.  
When we imagine what might happen if we fail to take charge 
of our happiness, we realize that this is not just about whether we are 
feeling sad or glad. It greatly matters for our existence and ultimate 
satisfaction in reflecting on it. And when we understand our happiness 
and what it takes to be happy, we also realize that happiness matters 
beyond our immediate self because our existence is not isolated. In a 
connected existence, the unhappiness of others reflects on ours and 
vice versa in a circular motion. Similar statements can be made about 
our more extended environment. When we act in consideration of this 
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interactivity and apply the resulting respect, unexpected degrees and 
ranges of harmonization in us, our surroundings, and between them set 
in. Mindful attention to our happiness affects us in ways that advance 
not only our own well-being but also the well-being of our human and 
nonhuman environment. Happiness turns out to be the most important 
guiding light for literally everything that matters to humans, or at least 
what should matter. Its all-encompassing quality gives us choices. If we 
make the wrong choices, we have the proven potential to mess things 
up. If we make the right choices, this world could be a paradise. 
Maybe the lure of this attainable paradise is not yet within our 
imagination’s grasp because we never experienced anything close to it. 
And quite possibly, we will have to experience the intensified pressure 
of unhappiness before we step out of our closets and routines to make 
the effort of actively reviewing and improving our existence. At such a 
point in time, our options may be curtailed by an advanced state of our 
deteriorating situation or desperation. 
Still, we can take heart in the fact that our sensations of happiness and 
unhappiness steer us toward an appropriate determination whether we 
should take action. The only question we need to clarify for ourselves is 
what exactly we should do to improve our happiness. The crux regularly 
lies in this latter problem of what to do, not in motivation, which arrives 
by itself when we need it. Individuals and societies are from time to time 
motivated to step outside of themselves when they cannot bear their pain 
anymore or see their hope in betterment betrayed or slipping away. The 
problem and pervasive tragedy for humans and humanity so far has been 
that people fail to act because they do not know how, or that when they 
take action, they select erroneous and destructive paths because of their 
own confusion or deception by others and pent up anxiousness.  
This is where the program of self-empowerment I describe 
comes in. Rather than taking a journey into the unknown that may 
lead them astray, my readers may decide to use the work I have 
invested over the years to accelerate and more clearly direct theirs. 
My role is not to tell people whether or when they should review 
their happiness to find means and strategies for its improvement, 
but to assist them if and whenever they decide the time is right for 
them. At such point, they can pick up my Philosophy of Happiness 
book to serve them as motivator, travel advisor, and itinerary on 
their self-directed journey of self-exploration. Because this is a trip 
to explore the entirety of our individual world, there are no easy 
and quick shortcuts. But we spend all our lives in the pursuit of happiness anyway. Even if we have scaled 
back objectives and pursuits from our dreams, we still labor trying to make the best of our situation. Why 
not avail ourselves of a considered, comprehensive approach that raises our chances of succeeding?  
Zhuang Zhou (Zhuangzi)  
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9. Further Reading. 
1. Works Related to Philosophy of Happiness by the Author. 
a) Philosophy of Happiness Book. 1000 pages, Kindle, E-pub, and PDF e-book, hardcover, and 
paperback. Comprehensive coverage of common issues pertaining to a philosophy of happiness.  
b) Knowing Book Series. Six-part series of philosophical quotes and poems. 226 pages each, 
Kindle and paperback. Companions to the Philosophy of Happiness book that avail readers of more 
apportioned and casual approaches toward an exploration of their happiness. 
c) Philosophic Reflections. A collection of essays revealing Martin Janello’s motivations, 
illustrations, and resulting considerations of philosophical exploration. Examples of experiences and 
interests that can form one’s philosophy. Free of charge download of 43-page PDF e-book. 
d) Philosophy of Happiness YouTube Channel. Contains a video from which this introduction was 
derived. Regular videos on issues of happiness and its philosophy. 
e) Philosophy of Happiness Website. Additional opportunities to explore the philosophy of 
happiness with more information and excerpts of the Philosophy of Happiness book and other materials. 
Contains FAQ, Forum, Blog, and Contact sections.  
2. Encyclopedias. Some encyclopedias continue in traditional parts to perpetuate false myths of 
separation and superiority of Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy vis-à-vis so-called Continental philosophy, 
let alone non-Western philosophy traditions, which were widely ignored until recently. Significant work is 
in process to fix this unprofessional, embarrassing parochial bias in English language resources, pushed 
along by the fact that English has become the lingua franca of philosophy. Inclusiveness is most effectively 
achieved by the worldwide inclusion of contributors and editors. I advise to look for this in your searches. 
a) Wikipedia. Use of Wikipedia on subjects of this article is highly discouraged since its pseudo-
democratic, anonymously autocratic and bureaucratic method inherently lacks quality and reliability. I 
found its entries to be uneven, ranging from the occasionally scholarly to mostly amateurish or agenda-
driven treatments beset by incomprehension, shallowness, errors, omissions, and misrepresentations. 
The problem is that, apart from extremes of this range, the difference may not be apparent to unfamiliar 
readers. The indiscriminate listing of Wikipedia on top of search engine results despite its decline makes 
sampling what it says enticing. However, I believe anybody trying to get to the core of happiness and its 
philosophy - or just casually reviewing the subject to see what they can find - would do themselves a great 
disservice being misdirected or discouraged by its inept, incorrect, and incomplete information. Any of 
the alternatives cited below offer vastly superior reliability, orientation, organization, insight, and context. 
b) Encyclopedia Britannica. Alright for general orientation, but varying quality level and at times 
odd or antiquated statements and choices of importance and language. Convoluted references. Free with 
ads. Subscription with 7-day free trial then, $74.95/year or $8.99 monthly. I suggest skipping it. 
c) Encyclopedia.com. A better-written and better-organized up-to-date on-line encyclopedia with 
material from over 200 individual encyclopedias and reference books from reputable publishers, including 
Oxford University Press, Columbia, and Cengage. Free access with minimal ads. Recommended as a start.  
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d) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Established in 1995. Free of charge. An on-line academic 
research tool with about 1600 entries. Good effort to increase coverage of non-Western philosophies. 
Focus on continual updating by entry authors with editor oversight. Governed by a table of contents that 
is really an eclectic alphabetical index. Suffers from lack of organization among articles, holes in coverage, 
weak cross-referencing, and insufficient contextualizing of topics. Excellent if sometimes too short on the 
topics it covers. Comprehensive bibliographies. A bit unwieldy for beginners. Unless you are looking for 
something specific that this encyclopedia might cover, you might prefer one of the encyclopedias below.  
e) Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Established in 1995. Free of charge. Well-written online 
research tool for wide range of readers. Written and maintained by an impressive roster of professionals 
plus an editing board from around the world. Peer-reviewed academic level information on a growing, 
already rather comprehensive range of philosophers and topics. Good effort to increasingly take account 
of philosophy as a worldwide phenomenon and discipline. Searchable by alphabetical index or categories 
(“browse by topic”). Excellent in the content it covers. Comprehensive bibliographies. Recommended. 
f) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Originally published in 1998 in hard-copy as 10-volume 
set and CD-ROM, 8680 pages. Expanded on-line version by subscription to libraries only. Free search of 
articles, article summaries, introductory articles, and earlier versions of revised or replaced articles. Over 
2,800, regularly updated entries. Impressive navigation tools, context, and cross-referencing. Summaries 
and overviews give good expositions. Valiant effort to incorporate non-western philosophies. Print version 
is getting a little long in the tooth on developing subjects. The limitation of this encyclopedia to libraries 
is regrettable because this is otherwise an eminently accessible, precise, and comprehensive research tool 
that I think is unmatched in the English language. Check with your library how you can get access. 
g) Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 10-volume set, 2nd edition, 2005, 6200 pages. Originally published 
by Macmillan Reference USA in 1967. Now only available as e-book with 7799 pages. 2,100+ entries of 
varied detail. Substantially updated and expanded since 1st edition, yet replacing worthwhile parts. Good 
non-Western philosophy content. Mostly comprehensible without any philosophical training. Includes a 
thematic outline of contents and solid bibliographies. Because it is much less expensive than Routledge 
Encyclopedia, chances are better that your local community library may have it. A good research tool. But 
if you have a choice, go with the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, particularly if your library makes 
its online version available. If you are not a library goer, you probably will be best served by the Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, comparing notes maybe with the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
h) Single-Volume Philosophy Encyclopedias or Dictionaries. This compressed format can convey 
very general ideas of the field and elicit interest to find out more. However, its alphabetical organization 
confuses and hides context and development. This, together with the abbreviations and generalizations 
this sort of summarization requires, can dead-end inquiries more than assisting them. Conversely, readers 
may get the impression they grasped philosophical phenomena when this is outright impossible based on 
these summaries. They can only give outlines whose meaning cannot be unlocked without further study. 
This may be fine for mechanical school learning and testing, but not for inquisitive study. Even as a starting 
point, compressed encyclopedias waste time and effort in skimming that can be better spent. With this 
warning, here are the better ones in declining sequence of recommendation:  
i) The Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1st ed. 2000, 1030 pages, hardcopy, paperback. 
Summaries of all 2000 entries from the 10-volume Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Good. 
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ii) The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1st ed. 2005, 1104 pages, hardcopy, e-book, 
and on-line. Abridged version of the 10-volume Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Selective. 
iii) The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 2nd ed. 2015, 1201 pages, hardcopy, paperback, e-book. 
iv) The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. 2nd ed. 2005, 1076 pages, hardcopy and on-line. 
v) Blackwell Companion to Philosophy. 2nd edition 2008, 976 pages. Introductory text book taking a 
run through traditional Western philosophy, highlighting key issues and arguments. Didactic style for 
school and test purposes. Limited glossary and reading references. Somewhat useful. Attempts to 
connect philosophy with current issues, but engages in questionable categorizations and judgments.  
3. Monographs, Handbooks. 
a) The Routledge Philosophers. A series of ca. 30 books introducing Western philosophers and 
discussing highlights and context of their work. Includes chronology, glossary, summaries, and suggestions 
for additional reading. Recommended. 
b) Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. 130 volumes. Introductions through conglomerates of 
essays, each of which authored by different scholars. Interesting assortments of views, but rather topical 
and eclectic. Although the style is geared toward general comprehension, the disparate content of these 
companions may be too disorienting for a novice. I suggest first getting a solid basis in the covered topics. 
c) Oxford Handbooks Online. Excellent collections of articles on themes and specialized areas of 
philosophy. Similar to Cambridge Companions, but aimed at more advanced readers and the propulsion 
of discussion. This suggests preparation at a higher level. Subscription only offered to institutions.  
d) Wadsworth Philosophers Series. Out of print, but many titles still available new and used. Over 
100 titles on philosophers in the Eastern and Western traditions. Concise, well-written introductions to 
philosophers and their work with adequate but sometimes incomplete coverage of major points.  
e) Rowohlt Monographien. This fantastic German series is sadly out of print since 2017, but some 
titles still available new and many used. Online version pulled as well. Over 700 titles, hundreds of them 
on philosophers and their work. Excellent introductions with thorough enablement of further studies.  
f) Les Collections Microcosme. This great French out-of-print series of publisher Editions du Seuil 
contained among other sections treatises about philosophers and their works, Écrivains de Toujours 
(1951-1981 and 1994-2000), and about religions and their promoters, Maîtres Spirituels (1955-1998). 
4. Source Texts and Reading Introductions. 
a) Public Domain Sites. The age of many philosophical texts and secondary literature places most 
of them within the public domain. A great number of them are freely accessible through these sites: 
Project Gutenberg  / Internet Archive  / Open Library  / Internet Classics Archive  / Open Culture 
b) Dover Philosophical Classics, Western Philosophy and Religion, Eastern Philosophy and 
Religion. A good set of mainstream introductions and texts. Discounted selection in Thrift Editions. 
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c) Oxford World’s Classics Philosophy. About 75 reprints and translations of mainstream classic 
texts. Substantial introductions, notes, chronologies, and bibliographies in support of the texts. 
d) Penguin Classics & Portable Series. Reprints and translations of traditional texts. 
e) Routledge Philosophic Classics. Anthology series of traditional categories with introductions.  
f) Blackwell Philosophy Anthology & Readings History of Philosophy. Key texts with comments. 
5. Comprehensive Philosophy Publishers. 
a) Routledge. 8000 titles. Clearly categorized. Gold standard in selection and quality. 
b) Oxford. Over 8000 books and dozens of journals, well-organized, much on-line.  
c) Springer. 6200+ books and 475+ series, 60+ journals. E-books and print. Some in German. 
d) Brill. 4250+ books, 37 journals. Some in German. E-books and print. 
e) De Gruyter. 7200+ books, 45 journals. Some in German. E-books and print. 
f) Bloomsbury. Thousands of titles. Interesting world philosophy entries. E-books and print. 
g) Rowman & Littlefield. Thousands of titles. Well-organized catalog. E-books and print. 
h) Cambridge. 3300+ book titles. Well-organized. E-books and print. 
i) MacMillan Palgrave. 3000+ books, 67 series, 7 journals. Basic to specialized. E-books and print. 
j) Penguin Randomhouse. 1000+ books, well-organized print catalog.  
k) Hackett. 450+ print titles. Introductions to philosophies and philosophers plus translations. 
Presence in classical philosophy and texts but also modern traditional philosophy.  
l) Wiley. Includes Blackwell. 400 titles, mostly e-books and print. Well-organized.  
m) Other Publishers. Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Cornell, Stanford, Chicago, Notre Dame, Edinburgh, 
McGill, Indiana, Princeton, MIT, Imprint Academic, Polity, Michigan, Open Court, Northwestern, UCal. 
6. Search Tools for Philosophy Publications. 
a) Philpapers. A comprehensive index and bibliography of philosophy. Comprehensively monitors 
all sources of research content in philosophy. Also hosts the largest open access archive in philosophy. 
b) JSTOR. Digital library. Access to 12 million plus academic journal articles, books, and primary 
sources, including philosophy. Basic access free, increased access through participating libraries or paid. 
7. Popular Titles. Philosophy isles of actual and virtual bookstores have become infested with 
series recognizable by hooks in their name or otherwise suggesting philosophical popularization. Titles I 
reviewed are, with very few exceptions, caricatures with romanced catchphrases, slogans, and dumbed-
down descriptions. They might impress at cocktail parties unless someone asks questions. At best, they 
hold some entertainment value in their over-simplifications and desperate strain for popularity and sales.  
